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 A PREDICTION MARKET FOR CLIMATE 
OUTCOMES 
SHI-LING HSU*
This Article proposes a way of introducing some 
organization and tractability in climate science, generating 
more widely credible evaluations of climate science, and 
imposing some discipline on the processing and 
interpretation of climate information. I propose a two-part 
policy instrument consisting of (1) a carbon tax that is 
indexed to a “basket” of climate outcomes, and (2) a cap-and-
trade system of emissions permits that can be redeemed in 
the future in lieu of paying the carbon tax. The amount of the 
carbon tax in this proposal (per ton of CO2) would be set each 
year on the basis of some objective, non-manipulable climate 
indices, such as temperature and mean sea level, and also on 
the number of certain climate events, such as flood events or 
droughts, that occurred in the previous year (or some moving 
average of previous years). I refer to these indices and events 
as climate outcomes. In addition to a carbon tax rate being 
set each year, an auction would be held each year for 
tradable permits to emit a ton of carbon dioxide in separate, 
specific, future years. That is, in the year 2012, a number of 
permits to emit in 2013 would be auctioned, as well as a 
number of permits to emit in 2014, in 2015, and so forth. In 
the year 2013, some more permits to emit in 2014 would be 
auctioned, as well as more permits to emit in 2015, 2016, 
and so forth. 
 
The permits to emit in the future are essentially unitary 
exemptions from a future carbon tax: An emitter can either 
pay the carbon tax or surrender an emissions permit to emit 
in the specific vintage year. Because of this link between the 
carbon tax and the permit market, the trading price of the 
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permits should reflect market expectations of what the 
carbon tax will be in the future and, concomitantly, 
expectations of future climate outcomes. The idea is to link 
the price of tradable permits to future climate outcomes, so 
that a market is created in which accurate and credible 
information about future climate conditions are important 
inputs into the price of permits. The market for tradable 
permits to emit in the future is essentially a prediction 
market for climate outcomes. And yet, unlike prediction 
markets that have been operated or proposed thus far, this 
prediction market for climate outcomes operates against the 
backdrop of an actual and substantial tax liability. Whereas 
prediction markets have heretofore largely involved only 
recreational trading, this prediction market will operate 
against a regulatory backdrop and thus will provide much 
stronger incentives for traders to acquire and trade on 
information. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Few challenges in the history of humankind have received 
as much attention or been the target of as much funding as 
global climate change. This unprecedented deployment of 
resources seems warranted, given the potential for vast, 
sweeping environmental changes that could not only 
destabilize vital ecosystems but also lead to civil unrest that 
could politically destabilize entire regions. Climate change is 
also alone among environmental problems in its extraordinary 
complexity and inherent uncertainty, therefore requiring a 
massive research effort. But a spastic outpouring of money has 
only produced a huge and intractable body of science trying 
very hard but falling short of predicting future climate 
conditions. Layered on top of this literature is another set of 
educated guesses, the variety of possible human response 
scenarios to climate conditions, which in turn could affect the 
future climate.1 These disparate and complicated bodies of 
knowledge, products of research efforts at hundreds of 
universities and research institutes throughout the world, have 
been foisted upon a hapless global public in desperate need of a 
“Climate Change for Dummies” manual.2
 
 1. Integrated assessment models link climate change effects and economic 
activity effects in a joint climate and economic model to project climate changes 
and economic costs and benefits together. For a review of the two dozen or so 
integrated assessment models, see NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 164–73 (2007), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm; see also Hans-Martin Füssel & Michael 
D. Mastrandrea, Integrated Assessment Modeling, in CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE 
AND POLICY 150, 150–61 (Stephen H. Schneider et al. eds., 2010). 
 
 2. One book, Global Warming for Dummies by Elizabeth May and Zoë Caron, 
is available, but by most indicators, it does not seem to be as popular as one would 
expect it to be. Elizabeth May is the leader of the Green Party, A Message from 
Elizabeth May, GREEN PARTY CAN., http://greenparty.ca/leader (last visited Aug. 
10, 2011), and Zoë Caron serves on the board of directors for the Sierra Club, 
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Into this comprehension vacuum has rushed a variety of 
interest groups that have helped produce a public discourse 
that has been at times emotional and vitriolic, and at other 
times puzzlingly apathetic, but rarely constructive and rarely 
leading to rational policy discussion. Climate scientists, not 
generally accustomed to the glare of public policy debate, have 
found themselves the targets of accusations, investigations, 
and sometimes death threats.3
This Article proposes a way of introducing some 
organization and tractability in climate science, generating 
more widely credible evaluations of climate science, and 
imposing some discipline on the processing and interpretation 
of climate information. I propose a two-part policy 
instrument—a tax-and-cap-and-trade program consisting of (1) 
a carbon tax that is indexed to a “basket” of climate outcomes 
(including, but not limited to, temperatures), and (2) a cap-and-
trade system of emissions permits, nested inside this carbon 
tax, that can be redeemed in lieu of paying the carbon tax. The 
amount of the carbon tax in this proposal (per ton of carbon 
dioxide (CO2)) would be set each year on the basis of some 
objective, non-manipulable climate indices, such as 
temperature and mean sea level, and also on the measured 
 In this science policy discussion 
of supreme importance, it is painfully obvious that more heat 
than light is emerging from the vast amount of climate 
information available and that the lay public has 
understandably thrown up its hands and tried to not think 
about climate change. Climate policy has suffered as a result. 
 
Board of Directors, SIERRA CLUB CAN., http://www.sierraclub.ca/en/board-
directors (last visited Aug. 10, 2011). As of June 26, 2011, the Amazon.com sales 
rank for the book was 1,095,219, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/Global-
Warming-Dummies-Elizabeth-May/dp/0470840986, as opposed to The Rough 
Guide to Climate Change by Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change climate 
scientist Robert Henson, which ranked 143,368, AMAZON.COM, 
http://www.amazon.com/Rough-Guide-Climate-Change-2nd/dp/1858281059/ref= 
sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1311376968&sr=1-1, or The Climate Crisis: An 
Introductory Guide to Climate Change by David Archer and Stefan Rahmstorf, 
which ranked 24,542, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/Climate-Crisis-
Introductory-Guide-Change/dp/0521732557/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid= 
1311377058&sr=1-1. 
 3. See, e.g., Climate Scientists in U.S. Barraged with Death Threats, 
CLIMATEWIRE (July 7, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2010/07/07/4 
(paid subscription); Climate Scientists Receive Death Threats, ABCNEWS.COM 
(May 24, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/video/climate-scientists-receive-
death-threats-10729457; Stephen Leahy, Violent Backlash Against Climate 
Scientists, INTER PRESS SERVICE (Mar. 9, 2010), 
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50607. 
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severity of certain climate events, such as hurricanes or 
droughts, that occurred in the preceding year or some moving 
average of previous years. In addition to a carbon tax rate being 
set each year, an auction would be held each year for tradable 
permits to emit a ton of CO2 in separate, specific, future years. 
That is, in the year 2012, a number of permits to emit in 2013 
would be auctioned, as well as a number of permits to emit in 
2014, in 2015, and so forth. In 2013, some more permits to emit 
in 2014 would be auctioned, as well as more permits to emit in 
2015, and so forth. 
The permits to emit in the future are the key to this 
proposal. Permits would be unitary exemptions from a future 
carbon tax: An emitter can either pay the carbon tax or 
surrender an emissions permit to emit in the specific vintage 
year. Because of this link between the carbon tax and the 
permit market, the trading price of the permits should reflect 
market expectations of what the carbon tax will be in the 
future and, concomitantly, expectations of future climate 
outcomes. The idea is to link the price of tradable permits to 
future climate outcomes so that a market is created in which 
accurate and credible data about future climate conditions are 
inputs into the price of permits. The market for tradable 
permits to emit in the future is essentially a prediction market 
for climate outcomes. 
In prediction markets, as in futures markets, contracts are 
bought and sold in which payoffs are contingent upon specified 
future outcomes.4 The trading prices of contracts thus rise and 
fall with the perceived probabilities of their occurrence. 
Prediction markets have a fairly long but inconspicuous history 
of successfully predicting a variety of outcomes, such as 
electoral outcomes.5 The Iowa Electronic Markets project,6
 
 4. Prediction markets are really an extension of futures markets, with 
outcomes taking on a broader range of possibilities. While futures markets 
usually contemplate the delivery of some agricultural commodity or other 
resource (such as natural gas), shares in a prediction market can be predicated on 
any outcome. 
 one 
of the pioneers of prediction markets, has long successfully 
operated a presidential election market in which “shares” of 
candidates are bought and sold, their trading price proving to 
be an accurate predictor of their vote share or the probability of 
 5. See discussion infra Part II. 
 6. Tippie Coll. of Bus., The Univ. of Iowa, IOWA ELECTRONIC MARKETS, 
http://tippie.uiowa.edu/iem/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 11, 2011) [hereinafter IEM 
PROJECT]. 
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their victory. But this proposal goes well beyond what most 
prediction markets have thus far tried to accomplish: This 
proposal creates a prediction market that is connected to an 
actual regulatory instrument with very substantial financial 
implications. The indexed carbon tax proposed here, even 
though quite modest, will give rise to a prediction market of 
unprecedented size and will create unprecedented incentives 
for information compilation and revelation. 
At the same time, the advantages of prediction markets 
are uniquely useful in processing climate science. First, the 
ability of prediction markets to aggregate and organize vast, 
disparate pieces of information is nowhere employed as 
productively as in the case of climate change. With climate 
science coming from so many quarters and drawing on 
information that is local in many ways, prediction markets are 
a singularly effective way to process the otherwise intractably 
numerous bodies of climate science. Second, prediction markets 
tap into pecuniary self-interest to process information in a way 
that is presumptively free of bias or preference for certain 
outcomes. This advantage is of crucial importance in the 
climate debate, as climate science is in need of not only 
aggregation and filtering, but also an institution that can scrub 
out some of the taint of ideology or political manipulation. In 
the current environment, beliefs about climate change are too 
intertwined with a variety of economic and professional 
interests, such that virtually no one can make an assertion 
about climate change without being accused of having some 
interest—economic, professional, or psychic—in convincing 
others. In prediction markets, it is simply too costly to sustain 
a disingenuous position. It is harder to put your money where 
your mouth is when you do not truly believe what you are 
saying, particularly when market prices are providing constant 
feedback. 
This marriage between the idea of prediction markets and 
the problem of climate science draws out, as marriages should, 
the best of each partner. There is no better mechanism for 
processing climate science than prediction markets, and there 
is no better way to showcase the power of prediction markets 
than to apply one to climate science. In climate science, 
prediction markets have found their heretofore highest and 
best calling, and in prediction markets, climate science has 
found its redeemer. While this proposal could reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, the primary purpose of this proposal 
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is not to regulate or price emissions but to create a market that 
harnesses, processes, and even creates information about 
climate science in a way that is presumptively free of ideology 
and bias. 
This tax-and-cap-and-trade mechanism also enjoys a 
political advantage. In this proposal, the carbon tax would be a 
low one and would increase only if climate change turns out, 
after all, to be a real problem. By indexing the carbon tax to 
climate outcomes, it creates a pay-as-you-go policy, requiring 
payments from carbon emitters as the consequences of their 
emissions become more tangible and costly. Because the 
climatic anomalies of climate change will impose costs and in 
some cases necessitate disaster assistance, the proceeds from 
the carbon tax and the auction proceeds from the cap-and-trade 
program can be used to provide this assistance. In this sense, 
this tax-and-cap-and-trade program is a pay-as-is-needed 
policy of assistance. Couched as a funding mechanism rather 
than a revenue-grab, it may be easier to sell to a tax-averse 
public. 
Part I of this Article provides a background of the 
information problems that have plagued climate science and 
hampered the development of climate policy. Part II of this 
Article provides some background theory and practice of 
prediction markets. Part III sets forth the proposed policy, 
setting out the details of the policy proposal, along with some 
rationales for the many micro-decisions that need to be made 
for this proposal to work. Part IV addresses some of the 
implementation issues created by this proposal, as well as some 
of the political realities that this proposal is likely to encounter. 
Part V concludes with some summary remarks. 
I. WHY IS CLIMATE SCIENCE SO HARD? 
While public opinion on the seriousness of climate change 
has fluctuated,7 the general public has consistently harbored 
fundamental misunderstandings about the causes and risks of 
climate change8
 
 7. Lydia Saad, Did Hollywood’s Glare Heat Up Public Concern About Global 
Warming?, GALLUP (Mar. 21, 2007), http://www.gallup.com/poll/26932/Did-
Hollywoods-Glare-Heat-Public-Concern-About-Global-Warming.aspx. 
 and has maintained an inflated perception of 
 8. For example, a recent study found that sixty-seven percent of Americans 
believe that “reducing toxic waste” would reduce global warming, while forty-
three percent believe that “punching holes in the ozone layer with rockets” 
contributes to global warming. ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET AL., YALE PROJECT ON 
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the extent of disagreement among climate scientists.9
Clearly, part of the problem is due to an active campaign 
waged by a legion of “climate skeptics”
 Why is it 
that global climate change seems to pose such a problem in 
terms of knowledge dissemination? Hasn’t humankind 
grappled with new and complicated sciences before—like 
nuclear energy and weaponry, space exploration, and 
information technology—and eventually wrestled them down to 
some satisfactory understanding? Why can’t people get their 
heads wrapped around climate change? 
10 of varying credibility 
who have challenged conventional climate wisdom and 
scrutinized a broad range of assertions by climate scientists. 
Some climate skeptics are more serious and thoughtful than 
others, and some raise more legitimate issues than others. The 
labels “climate skeptics” and “climate scientists” are not 
intended to suggest that climate skeptics do not include 
scientists in their ranks. They include M.I.T. climate science 
professor Richard Lindzen, an outspoken climate skeptic.11 On 
occasion, Lindzen has been accused of overselling his climate 
skepticism,12
 
CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, AMERICANS’ KNOWLEDGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 11–
12 (2010), available at http://environment.yale.edu/climate/files/ 
ClimateChangeKnowledge2010.pdf. 
 but for the most part Lindzen’s disagreements 
 9. See, e.g., Matthew C. Nisbet & Teresa Myers, Twenty Years of Public 
Opinion About Global Warming, 71 PUB. OPINION Q. 444, 450–54 (2007); Frank 
Newport, Americans’ Global Warming Concerns Continue to Drop, GALLUP (Mar. 
11, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/126560/americans-global-warming-
concerns-continue-drop.aspx. 
 10. “Climate skeptics” is a common term describing people who have doubts 
about the validity of the science supporting action on climate change. “Skeptic” 
and “skepticism” are terms that are commonly used by advocates for policy action 
on climate change. See, e.g., Coby Beck, How to Talk to a Climate Skeptic, GRIST, 
http://www.grist.org/article/series/skeptics (last visited Apr. 22, 2011); John Cook, 
How Climate Skeptics Mislead, SKEPTICAL SCI. (June 13, 2010), 
http://www.skepticalscience.com/how-climate-skeptics-mislead.html. The terms 
are also used by the skeptics themselves. See, e.g., THE CLIMATE SCEPTICS, 
http://climatesceptics.net (last visited Apr. 22, 2011) (subtitled “[t]he world’s first 
political party representing scepticism and objectivity in climate policy”); CLIMATE 
SKEPTIC, http://www.climate-skeptic.com (last visited Apr. 22, 2011). 
 11. See, e.g., Richard S. Lindzen, The Climate Science Isn’t Settled, WALL ST. 
J., Nov. 30, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870393940457 
4567423917025400.html. 
 12. Lindzen and several other physics professors once wrote an open letter to 
Congress titled, “To the Congress of the United States: You are being deceived 
about global warming,” and claiming, among many other things, that “there is no 
such evidence; it doesn’t exist.” Letter from Robert H. Austin et al. to the 111th 
Cong. (July 1, 2009), available at http://www.climatedepot.com/a/1745/Scientists-
Write-Open-Letter-to-Congress-You-Are-Being-Deceived-About-Global-Warming--
Earth-has-been-cooling-for-ten-years. This letter was sharply criticized by his 
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with climate scientists have been on scientific grounds, mainly 
having to do with the effect of clouds on climate change.13 
Skeptics also include Roy Spencer, a respected climatologist at 
the University of Alabama at Huntsville, who developed a 
global temperature database based on satellite data.14
Skepticism not grounded in science, however, has also been 
a part of the climate debate. This less credible skepticism has 
either been very selective in attacking climate science or taken 
the form of specious allegations of conspiracy or scientific 
misconduct. The recent “Climategate” affair, in which a 
number of emails to and from climate scientists were 
mysteriously stolen and leaked, has raised the suggestion that 
climate scientists have engaged in data manipulation.
 
Scientific progress depends on skepticism, and it would be 
unprincipled to dismiss the challenges posed by Lindzen and 
Spencer, at least when they are grounded in science. 
15
 
M.I.T. colleague, Kerry Emanuel, who subsequently blogged on a website for the 
National Association of Scholars that he “confronted the sole climate scientist 
among the authors with this statement, and he confessed that he did not hold that 
to be the case. Last I checked, lying to Congress was a federal crime.” Kerry 
Emanuel, “Climategate”: A Different Perspective, NAT’L ASS’N SCHOLARS (July 19, 
2010), http://www.nas.org/polArticles.cfm?doc_id=1444. 
 
 13. Lindzen has hypothesized that rising temperatures increase the formation 
of cirrus clouds that would reflect solar radiation. Richard S. Lindzen et al., Does 
the Earth Have an Adaptive Infrared Iris?, 82 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 
417 (2001). A subsequent study found that the effect of cirrus clouds actually 
leads to greater warming, not less. Bing Lin et al., The Iris Hypothesis: A Negative 
or Positive Cloud Feedback?, 15 J. CLIMATE 3 (2002). Lindzen has also 
hypothesized that increased sea surface temperatures correspond with higher 
rates of radiation leaving the Earth’s atmosphere. Richard S. Lindzen & Yong-
Sang Choi, On the Determination of Climate Feedbacks from ERBE Data, 36 
GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L16705, 6 (2009). This has been criticized for 
assuming away energy flows in and out of the tropics. Kevin. E. Trenberth et al., 
Relationships Between Tropical Sea Surface Temperature and Top-of-Atmosphere 
Radiation, 37 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L03702 (2010). 
 14. Roy W. Spencer & John R. Christy, Precise Monitoring of Global 
Temperature Trends from Satellites, 247 SCIENCE 1558, 1558 (1990). 
 15. Reasonably objective accounts of the controversy are the exception, but 
one credible account was published by the Guardian (U.K.), not ordinarily known 
for its restraint. Incorporating public comments, the series seems to have 
accurately picked out the most salient details. Fred Pearce, Climate Wars, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/series/ 
climate-wars-hacked-emails. Some fundamental facts seem to account for much of 
the controversy. The data that were sought by climate skeptics have been 
presented in a fashion that would appear to be opaque, but the raw data were 
provided to researchers at the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) at the University of 
East Anglia, one of the centers of the controversy, on the condition that they not 
be publicly disseminated. Editorial, Closing the Climategate, 468 NATURE 345, 
345 (2010), available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v468/n7322/full/ 
468345a.html. 
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Although the scientists implicated in Climategate have been 
exonerated,16 doubt seems to persist about the credibility of 
climate science.17 Other forms of skeptical nonsense are more 
substantive. Some skeptics have asserted that global warming 
is due to increased sunspot activity, or that Arctic sea ice is 
actually increasing,18
 
It remains the case that many of the data used by CRU scientists 
are covered by agreements that prevent their wider distribution. . . . 
There are often good reasons for such sequestering of data, and 
some studies might not be done without it. But where the full 
information needed to reproduce a study is not publicly available, 
scientists have a duty to report that, and say why. 
 and have mis-cited sources as support for 
Id. 
 16. See, e.g., SIR MUIR RUSSELL ET AL., THE INDEPENDENT CLIMATE CHANGE 
E-MAILS REVIEW (2010), available at http://www.eenews.net/assets/2010/07/08/ 
document_cw_01.pdf; Lauren Morello, ‘Climategate’ Investigators Find No 
‘Deliberate’ Misconduct by Scientists, CLIMATEWIRE (Apr. 15, 2010), 
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2010/04/15/6 (paid subscription). 
 17. See, e.g., ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET AL., YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE COMMC’N, GLOBAL WARMING’S SIX AMERICAS 9 fig.1 (2010), available at 
http://environment.yale.edu/climate/files/SixAmericasJune2010.pdf (showing that 
from November 2008 to January 2010 (spanning the “Climategate” incident) those 
“alarmed” about global warming decreased from 18% to 10% and those 
“dismissive” (not at all concerned about global warming) rose from 7% to 16%. 
Those figures rebounded somewhat but remained below 2008 levels, with those 
alarmed rising back up to 13% in June 2010 and those dismissive dropping back 
down to 12%). See also David R. Baker, ‘Climategate’ Fallout May Impact 
Legislation, S.F. CHRON., July 19, 2010, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2010/07/19/MNNS1EFLDU.DTL; Patrik Jonsson, Climate 
Scientists Exonerated in ‘Climategate’ but Public Trust Damaged, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, July 7, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/2010/0707/ 
Climate-scientists-exonerated-in-climategate-but-public-trust-damaged. 
 18. While many people make these arguments, one prominent example is 
Lord Christopher Monckton, a former advisor to British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher and policy advisor to a think tank called the Science and Public Policy 
Institute. Personnel, SCI. & PUB. POL’Y INST., http://scienceandpublicpolicy.org/ 
personnel.html (last visited June 29, 2011). Monckton has asserted, among many 
other things, that sunspot activity was responsible for global warming and that 
we would begin to get global cooling, Minn. Free Mkt. Inst., Lord Christopher 
Monckton Speaking in St. Paul, YOUTUBE (Oct. 15, 2009), http:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=stij8sUybx0 at 1:07:00, and also that arctic sea ice 
has actually been increasing over the last thirty years, Protecting Lower-Income 
Families While Fighting Global Warming: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Income Sec. & Family Support of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th Cong. 41 
(2009) (statement of Lord Christopher Monckton), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg49410/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg49410.pdf. 
Sunspot activity has been thoroughly debunked as an explanation of global 
temperature changes. See, e.g., A.D. Erlykin et al., Solar Activity and the Mean 
Global Temperature, 4 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 014006, at 4–5 (2009); Mike 
Lockwood, Solar Change and Climate: An Update in the Light of the Current 
Exceptional Solar Minimum, 466 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y A 303, 323 (2010); T. Sloan 
& A.W. Wolfendale, Testing the Proposed Causal Link Between Cosmic Rays and 
Cloud Cover, 3 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 024001, at 6 (2008). Monckton’s statement 
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these assertions.19 While spurious claims are relatively easy for 
scientists to debunk, they are difficult for most others to 
process. Even spurious claims, some climate skeptics seem to 
have astutely calculated, muddy otherwise robust conclusions 
for a lay public with a limited attention span and competing 
demands for time. An unwitting media industry, conditioned to 
provide balanced reporting, has given equal time to climate 
skeptics, credible or not, and has helped to create an 
exaggerated impression of controversy among reputable 
climate scientists and experts.20
But it is ultimately self-defeating to focus on the role of 
climate skeptics in trying to explain why people have trouble 
understanding climate change. Even without an opposition 
campaign, the task of communicating and addressing climate 
change is bound to run into trouble. If there was ever a 
scientific problem that was tailor-made to create public doubt 
and confusion, it would be global climate change. This Part 
outlines some of the reasons that climate change is such a 
difficult problem to study and communicate. They stem from 
the disparate sources of climate science, the complexity of the 
science, and the overwhelming temptation for people to resist 
engagement with the complicated and depressing realities of 
climate science. 
 
A. Disparateness 
One obstacle to broad comprehension lies in the disparate, 
far-flung sources of climate science, which make it more 
difficult for the lay public to collate the information. Climate 
science probably should have many origins because climate 
 
that sea ice was declining was based on an inaccurate comparison of two carefully 
selected years, 1980 and 2009. For two of several rebuttals to this absurdity, see 
John Abraham, Abraham Shows Monckton Wrong on Arctic Sea Ice, SKEPTICAL 
SCI. (June 2, 2010), http://www.skepticalscience.com/print.php?n=214, and Alden 
Griffith, Is Arctic Sea Ice ‘Just Fine’?, SKEPTICAL SCI. (Aug. 18, 2010), 
http://www.skepticalscience.com/Is_Arctic_Sea_Ice_Just_Fine.html. 
 19. Lord Monckton, for example, stated that the International Astronomical 
Union “held a symposium” on solar activity and “concluded” that solar activity 
was largely responsible for increases in temperature, Minn. Free Mkt. Inst., supra 
note 18, at 1:07:55, a conclusion that was denied by the President of the 
International Astronomical Union’s Division of Sun and Heliosphere, John 
Abraham, Monckton Chronicles Part II—Here Comes the Sun?, SKEPTICAL SCI. 
(June 4, 2010), http://www.skepticalscience.com/print.php?n=216. 
 20. Maxwell T. Boykoff & Jules M. Boykoff, Balance as Bias: Global Warming 
and the US Prestige Press, 14 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 125 (2004). 
190 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
science draws on so many different sources of information, 
every ecosystem in every corner of the world having something 
to teach us about the effects of climate change and potential 
feedback effects. Studying climate change thus requires an 
extremely broad research effort; no single institution could 
undertake even a fraction of the research required to 
understand the broad impacts and sources of climate change. 
Moreover, some systems are so complex that multiple research 
efforts are required just to study one system or one aspect of 
climate change. 
To take just one example, there are no fewer than five U.S. 
government-funded institutes that have made it part of their 
core mission to study or fund the study of climate changes in 
the polar regions.21 And these five entities do not actually 
perform the bulk of the work; that is mostly left to the 
hundreds of groups and institutes based in academic 
institutions worldwide, many of which are funded by these five 
entities.22
There is probably considerable overlap in all of this 
research. But a time-consuming consolidation would clearly be 
unhelpful. Some of these entities already cooperate.
 But even collectively, all of these groups are, for lack 
of a better phrase, just the tip of the iceberg. 
23
 
 21. See, e.g., Arctic Climate Research: Overview, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., 
http://www.nsf.gov/news/special_reports/arctic/overview.jsp (last updated July 12, 
2008); Arctic Research of the Composition of the Troposphere from Aircraft and 
Satellites, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., http://www.nasa.gov/ 
mission_pages/arctas (last updated Aug. 7, 2008); NASA GODDARD INST. FOR 
SPACE STUD., http://www.giss.nasa.gov (last visited June 29, 2011); NAT’L ICE 
CENTER, http://www.natice.noaa.gov (last visited June 29, 2011); NOAA Arctic 
Research Program, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/arp (last visited June 29, 2011). 
 Each 
 22. See, e.g., BYRD POLAR RES. CENTER, OHIO ST. U., http://bprc.osu.edu (last 
updated June 2, 2011); INT’L ARCTIC RES. CENTER, U. ALASKA FAIRBANKS, 
http://www.iarc.uaf.edu (last visited July 6, 2011); NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA 
CENTER, http://nsidc.org (last visited July 6, 2011); Nordic Network on Sea-Ice 
Research, U. HELSINKI, http://www.helsinki.fi/netice (last visited July 6, 2011); 
Sea Ice Group, U. OTAGO, http://www.physics.otago.ac.nz/research/ice/index.html 
(last modified Oct. 8, 2008). 
 23. For example, the National Science Foundation’s Office of Polar Programs 
itself has several divisions, including one focusing on Arctic programs and one 
focusing on Antarctic programs. The website for the Division of Arctic Sciences 
states that “[t]he Foundation is one of 12 Federal agencies that sponsor or conduct 
arctic science, engineering, and related activities. As mandated by the Arctic 
Research and Policy Act of 1984, Federal interagency research planning is 
coordinated through the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC), 
which is chaired by NSF.” About the Division of Arctic Sciences, OFF. POLAR 
PROGRAMS, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/arc/about.jsp (last 
updated Feb. 4, 2010). 
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group, institute, or department has a unique perspective on the 
arctic environment, and each probably has something 
important to contribute as a stand-alone entity conducting 
arctic research. For example, the National Ice Center in 
Suitland, Maryland, has historically served as a navigational 
resource, collecting data on Arctic and Antarctic ice conditions, 
and is jointly operated by the U.S. Navy, the Coast Guard, and 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA).24
But how does anyone make sense of the barrage of 
information from these hundreds of entities? One institution, 
the United Nations-created Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC),
 The day-by-day ice monitoring is a vital information 
resource that complements, for example, the analytical 
modeling and forecasting expertise in other agencies. And the 
diversity of institutions also serves to monitor ice throughout 
the world, tracking the recession of glaciers in far-flung corners 
such as the Himalayas, the Rocky Mountains, and southern 
Chile. A large, diverse crowd of researchers is a good thing. 
25 has become a repository of climate 
research and a leading interpreter of climate science. Because 
of this leadership role, it has also served as a lightning rod. A 
relatively small number of errors in the IPCC’s 2000-plus-page 
2007 report on the science and policy of climate change26
 
 24. Mission Statement, NAT’L ICE CENTER, http://www.natice.noaa.gov/ 
mission.html?bandwidth=low (last visited June 29, 2011). 
 has 
 25. The IPCC is a United Nations-appointed body of over 400 scientists 
engaged in the science of climate change. It was created and staffed as part of an 
attempt to develop some science that was as broadly representative as possible of 
the divergent viewpoints on climate science. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch (last visited June 29, 2011). Often criticized, 
the IPCC was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, along with former U.S. Vice 
President Al Gore, in 2007. The Nobel Peace Prize 2007, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007 (last visited Apr. 22, 
2011). 
 26. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter 
IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg1_report_ 
the_physical_science_basis.htm. The IPCC came under fire for making a 
surprising claim that Himalayan glaciers could melt away by the year 2035, a 
claim that was based upon a media interview with a glacier scientist in 1999. For 
a description of the controversy, see Damian Carrington, IPCC Officials Admit 
Mistake over Melting Himalayan Glaciers, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Jan. 20, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jan/20/ipcc-himalayan-glaciers-
mistake. But the controversy over this mistake only seems to underscore the fact 
that the 2000-plus-page report contained few errors. For a discussion of the 
relatively few errors in the IPCC report, see Pew’s Gulledge Discusses Research 
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spurred calls for the dissolution of the IPCC, and not just by 
climate skeptics.27 But even if the IPCC was not (rightly or 
wrongly) under assault, it only serves as a rough compiler of 
climate science, only issuing assessment reports every six or 
seven years.28
In the meantime, it is a huge a challenge to keep track of 
the daily news about climate science developments, even for a 
dedicated layperson. Even if one is sophisticated and 
committed enough to subscribe to a news intermediary such as 
Greenwire,
 
29
B. Complexity and Uncertainty 
 the daily bombardment of climate research 
findings is overwhelming. Under these circumstances, it begins 
to appear rational to delegate some of the information 
processing to intermediaries, an interpretive vacuum that 
interest groups of all types have been happy to fill in a self-
serving manner. 
A second major cause of the climate comprehension 
problem is the complexity of climate science and the attendant 
uncertainties of modeling complex systems. Given the severity 
of these problems, we should probably feel fortunate to have a 
reasonably definitive projection of global mean temperature 
increase. The best estimate thus far, generated by the IPCC, is 
that a doubling of CO2 concentration in the Earth’s atmosphere 
will most likely lead to an increase in global mean temperature 
of 2° C to 4.5° C.30
 
and Reporting of Climate Science, E&ETV (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/ 
tv/transcript/1122. 
 But this is a wide range, and within it, a 
variety of things can happen. At a 2.5° C increase, the Prairie 
Pothole Region of the central United States and Canada, home 
to the most productive waterfowl habitat in the world, will lose 
almost forty percent of its seasonal wetlands; at a 4° C 
 27. John M. Broder, Scientists Taking Steps to Defend Work on Climate, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/03/ 
science/earth/03climate.html. 
 28. Assessment reports have been issued in 1990, 1995, 2001, and 2007. 
Reports, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml (last visited June 29, 
2011). The next one is due in 2014. Activities, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/activities/activities.shtml (last visited June 
29, 2011). 
 29. GREENWIRE, http://www.greenwire.com (last visited June 29, 2011). 
 30. IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT, supra note 26, at 12. 
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increase, the loss would be closer to eighty-five percent.31
Studying climate change is no less than studying how 
almost every system on Earth reacts to changing 
concentrations of greenhouse gases and incorporating them 
into one gigantic model. Climate models, developed for decades 
now, essentially try to do this. The most sophisticated climate 
models, “general circulation models” (GCMs), are so data-
intensive that they can only be run on the world’s most 
powerful supercomputers. GCMs depict the Earth’s atmosphere 
as a three-dimensional grid consisting of cells that are, at 
present, roughly 100 kilometers squared by one kilometer 
high.
 Given 
the extraordinary predictions that climate researchers are 
being asked to make, this example of uncertainty is not 
unreasonable. But it does not make for easy communication to 
a mass audience. 
32 Each of the resulting billions of cells is governed by a 
menu of physical, chemical, and biological equations that 
describe what happens in each cell, as well as a number of 
equations that describe energy transfers between cells.33 GCMs 
are validated and calibrated by seeing how well they reproduce 
past temperatures. Climate scientists have reconstructed 
historical records of temperatures using tree rings, mountain 
glaciers, coral reefs, and pollen from lake beds34 and have 
reconstructed historical CO2 concentrations from frozen air 
bubbles in ice core samples.35 Models are then run as if they 
were operating in the distant past and trying to predict a 
future (a more recent past) that climate scientists have already 
reconstructed.36 Despite the painstaking validation process, 
climate scientists have only slightly alleviated concerns about 
underlying model quality, especially as the historical 
reconstructions themselves have come under attack.37
 
 31. Lisa G. Sorenson et al., Potential Effects of Global Warming on Waterfowl 
Populations Breeding in the Northern Great Plains, 40 CLIMATIC CHANGE 343, 
358 fig.4a (assuming a seven percent increase in precipitation). 
 
 32. Michael D. Mastrandrea & Stephen H. Schneider, Climate Change Science 
Overview, in CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE AND POLICY, supra note 1, at 11, 23–24. 
 33. Id. at 23. 
 34. Id. at 12. 
 35. Id. at 16–18. 
 36. Id. at 25. 
 37. Most notably, the “hockey stick” controversy, referring to the hockey stick-
shaped graph of global temperatures as a function of time, has been a particularly 
bloody battleground, with some climate skeptics claiming that it is created by 
academic fraud, and climate scientists rallying around temperature modelers such 
as the embattled Michael Mann, one of the central figures in the “Climategate” 
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Climate modelers readily concede that even the most 
sophisticated GCMs can only do so much. While the resolution 
of GCMs is vastly improved from just a decade ago, much can 
happen within a space 100 kilometers squared by a kilometer 
high. Clouds, for example, are often smaller than a cell, so 
GCMs have only crudely modeled the behavior of clouds.38 
Climate modelers have also struggled to model the impact of 
aerosols, airborne particles (often pollution) that may reflect 
sunlight, reducing the amount of solar radiation trapped in the 
Earth’s atmosphere.39 Alternatively, they may also absorb 
sunlight and increase trapped heat.40 Climate modelers have 
also had to improvise in modeling certain non-anthropogenic 
events that affect climate, like the 1991 eruption of Mount 
Pinatubo, which spewed enough volcanic ash into the air to 
slightly cool global mean temperatures for years.41
Perhaps more importantly, climate modelers concede that 
GCMs are generally not very good in modeling many feedbacks 
that, as a result of temperature increases, could either amplify 
or attenuate a temperature increase.
 Every time 
something happens that affects climate, climate modelers have 
to scramble to figure out if their models can accurately 
reproduce the temperature changes resulting from the event. 
Therefore, uncertainties remain large. 
42 Cloud formation due to 
higher temperatures, for example, could potentially reflect 
sunlight and reduce temperatures43 or could trap more heat 
within the atmosphere and further increase temperatures.44 
Models are currently inconclusive in predicting which direction 
clouds will push temperatures.45 Models also struggle with 
projecting the formation of water vapor, which could increase 
with higher temperatures,46
 
affair. See Jonsson, supra note 
 and the emissions of methane, a 
17. The original hockey-stick analogy stemmed 
from a graph appearing in a 1998 article in Nature magazine, depicting the recent 
increase in global mean temperature as the “blade” part of a hockey stick. Michael 
E. Mann et al., Global Scale Temperature Patterns and Climate Forcing over the 
Past Six Centuries, 392 NATURE 779, 783 fig.5b (1998). 
 38. Mastrandrea & Schneider, supra note 32, at 24–25. 
 39. Id. at 19 (“[u]nfortunately, the uncertainty in aerosol radiative forcing 
complicates the assessment of ‘climate sensitivity’: the amount the Earth’s surface 
warms for a given increase in forcing”). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 25. 
 42. Id. at 21–23. 
 43. Lindzen et al., supra note 13, at 429. 
 44. IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT, supra note 26, at 635. 
 45. Id. at 636. 
 46. Id. at 593. 
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greenhouse gas twenty-five times more powerful than CO2.47 
The emission of methane could increase catastrophically as 
higher temperatures melt the Arctic permafrost that has 
trapped huge quantities of methane.48 That experts still have 
little idea of how much methane is being emitted49
Climate science has made enormous advances in the last 
several decades. But the world’s climate scientists, as a group, 
are tasked with a continuing research assignment unlike 
anything ever attempted. Uncertainty and complexity are 
naturally going to be parts of this process, which makes for 
problematic communications to a lay public that may not relish 
the complexity or have the patience for uncertainty and might 
just be looking for a reason not to think about such a 
depressing subject. 
 is indicative 
of the huge uncertainties that confront climate scientists. 
C. The Benefits of Denial 
A popular explanation of Galileo’s conviction of heresy is 
that the Catholic Church found his advocacy of Copernican 
astronomy threatening to the Church’s Ptolemaic, Earth-
centered astronomy.50
 
 47. Mastrandrea & Schneider, supra note 
 However, other more contextual versions 
32, at 18. 
 48. ROBERT HENSON, THE ROUGH GUIDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 86 (2d ed. 
2008). 
 49. Edward A.G. Schuur et al., The Effect of Permafrost Thaw on Old Carbon 
Release and Net Carbon Exchange from Tundra, 459 NATURE 556, 556 (2009) 
(“[t]he rate of carbon release from permafrost soils is highly uncertain”); K.M. 
Walter et al., Methane Bubbling from Siberian Thaw Lakes as a Positive Feedback 
to Climate Warming, 443 NATURE 71, 71 (2006). As Walter notes: 
Large uncertainties in the budget of atmospheric methane, an 
important greenhouse gas, limit the accuracy of climate change 
projections. Thaw lakes in North Siberia are known to emit 
methane, but the magnitude of these emissions remains uncertain 
because most methane is released through ebullition (bubbling), 
which is spatially and temporally variable. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 50. Galileo and the Inquisition, GALILEO PROJECT, http://galileo.rice.edu/bio/ 
narrative_7.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2010). This story finds some support in 
Biblical passages that, if taken literally, suggest that Earth is stationary and 
whatever objects that can be observed from the Earth are the moving objects. See 
Glenn Elert, The Scriptural Basis for a Geocentric Cosmology, E-WORLD (Apr. 25, 
1999), http://hypertextbook.com/eworld/geocentric.shtml. The Earth could be 
understood to stand still from the following passages: “tremble before him, all 
earth; yea, the world stands firm, never to be moved,” id. (emphasis added by 
Elert) (quoting 1 Chronicles 16:30) and “[y]ea, the world is established; it shall 
never be moved,” id. (emphasis added by Elert) (quoting Psalms 93:1). The sun 
could be understood to be moving from the following: 
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emphasize the extent to which Ptolemaic astronomy was the 
conventional wisdom and how Copernican sun-centered 
astronomy posed a threat to a broad set of social and economic 
interests outside of the Church.51 In this way, Galileo’s trial 
could be seen as more of a failed campaign than an anti-science 
persecution.52
Like Galileo, climate scientists face numerous threats and 
challenges as they seek to upend the value judgments implicit 
in a world economy that has equated fossil fuel combustion 
with economic growth. U.S. Senator James Inhofe, a long-time 
and vociferous climate skeptic, recently used his office in the 
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works to 
publish its own specious analysis of climate science, 
culminating with a list of seventeen climate scientists who, in 
Inhofe’s view, have perpetrated a “fraud” on the public.
 
53
 
Then spoke Joshua to the Lord in the day when the Lord gave the 
Amorites over to the men of Israel; and he said in the sight of Israel, 
“Sun, stand thou still at Gibeon, and thou Moon in the valley of 
Aijalon.” And the sun stood still, and the moon stayed, until the 
nation took vengeance on their enemies. Is this not written in the 
Book of Jashar? The sun stayed in the midst of heaven, and did not 
hasten to go down for about a whole day. 
 The 
Id. (emphasis added by Elert) (quoting Joshua 10:12–13). 
 51. Doug Linder, The Trial of Galileo, U. MO.—KANSAS CITY (2002), 
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/galileo/galileoaccount.html. As 
Linder points out: 
Copernicus’ theory was a challenge to the accepted notion contained 
in the natural philosophy of Aristotle, the astronomy of Ptolemy and 
the teachings of the Church that the sun and all the stars revolved 
around a stationary Earth. In the half-century since its publication, 
however, Copernicus’ theory met mostly with skepticism. 
Id. 
 52. See RICHARD G. OLSON, SCIENCE AND RELIGION, 1450–1900: FROM 
COPERNICUS TO DARWIN 16 (Johns Hopkins Paperbacks 2006) (2004) (arguing 
that there is little evidence of Church suppression of astronomical inquiry). One 
economist has even made the argument that it was the league of astronomy 
professors that persuaded the Church to quash dissent from the Ptolemaic theory, 
at that time the dominant theory taught in universities. E. RAY CANTERBERY, THE 
MAKING OF ECONOMICS—VOLUME I: THE FOUNDATION 64 (4th ed. 2003). 
 53. MINORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ENV’T & PUB. WORKS, 111TH CONG., 
‘CONSENSUS’ EXPOSED: THE CRU CONTROVERSY 35–37 (2010) [hereinafter CRU 
CONTROVERSY], available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction= 
Files.View&FileStore_id=7db3fbd8-f1b4-4fdf-bd15-12b7df1a0b63. The report 
states that, “[i]n our view, the CRU documents and emails reveal, among other 
things, unethical and potentially illegal behavior by some of the world’s 
preeminent climate scientists,” id. at 1, lists the federal laws that the scientists 
may have violated, id. at 30–31, lists seventeen climate scientists as “key 
players,” id. at 35–37, and says it is “investigating” those scientists for 
misconduct, id. at 32. Inhofe has infamously and persistently called global 
warming a “hoax.” See, e.g., Amanda Little, James Inhofe, Senate’s Top Skeptic, 
2011] PREDICTION MARKET FOR CLIMATE OUTCOMES 197 
charges have not stuck substantively, but have succeeded in 
clouding the reports and their authors.54 Even the even-keeled 
Economist called for the resignation of the head of the IPCC, 
Rajendra Pachauri,55 the man who American energy lobbyists 
and the George W. Bush administration fought hard to install 
as IPCC president.56 Most ominously, some climate scientists 
have received death threats relating to their climate work,57 
including the late Stanford climatologist Stephen Schneider, 
one of the early pioneers of climate science.58
Perhaps even more troubling than the fanaticism behind 
death threats is the indifference with which much of the global 
public receives climate science. Even as the IPCC issues more 
definitive and more worrisome findings, the appetite for 
legislative action on climate change, particularly in the United 
States, does not seem to reflect the alarm of climate 
scientists.
 
59 With so much at stake, the public reaction even 
among those that do consider climate change a problem 
amounts to little more than a shrug.60 A popular climate 
skeptic blog, Climate Audit, posted by retired Canadian mining 
executive Steve McIntyre, boasts an incredible audience, 
claiming over three million hits from September 12, 2010, 
through August 3, 2011.61
 
Explains His Climate-Hoax Theory, GRIST (Feb. 25, 2010), 
http://www.grist.org/article/2010-02-25-james-inhofe-senate-top-skeptic-explains-
climate-hoax-theory. 
 The large following of McIntyre’s 
blog appears to suggest that there are significant parts of the 
 54. Lauren Morello, Panel Criticizes IPCC Leadership but Upholds Science, 
CLIMATEWIRE (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2010/09/07/3 
(paid subscription). 
 55. Climate Controversies: Flawed Scientists, ECONOMIST, July 8, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/15450615 (“Dr. Pachauri has been a staunch 
defender of the panel as it is rather than an advocate for reform that would 
improve it. He is not the man to carry out the changes it badly needs.”). 
 56. Andrew C. Revkin, Dispute Arises over a Push to Change Climate Panel, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2002, at A10. 
 57. See sources cited supra note 3. 
 58. Schneider’s early works include The Genesis Strategy: Climate and Global 
Survival (1976) and Global Warming: Are We Entering the Greenhouse Century? 
(1989). 
 59. See LEISEROWITZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 9 fig.1. 
 60. For example, the Leiserowitz study reported that among those who were 
“concerned” about global warming, 15% of respondents reported that they paid “a 
lot” of attention to global warming, while 53% said they paid “some” and 31% said 
they paid “a little.” Id. at 13 tbl.4. Of the same “concerned” group, 29% said they 
were “very interested,” while 64% said they were “moderately interested.” Id. at 
15 tbl.6. 
 61. Steve McIntyre, CLIMATE AUDIT, http://climateaudit.org (last visited Aug. 
3, 2011). 
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general public that seem to at least be ready to be talked out of 
the dangers of climate change. Rational or not, it is a current 
reality that many people distrust the sources of the scientific 
predictions about future climate conditions. 
Climate scientists should not be any more surprised by the 
apathy than they are by the violence. If climate scientists are 
right, then the world faces a stark choice: either undertake 
fundamental changes in the way that almost every economy 
operates, imposing substantial costs on almost every country 
and society in the world, or roll the dice and see what happens 
with the Earth’s climate. Avoiding this question by finding 
fault with the underlying science provides enormous psychic 
benefits. 
D. Reform Proposals 
The disparate, complex, and uncertain nature of climate 
information thus makes it convenient for people to find fault 
with climate science. Who wants to do the work required to 
keep pace with climate science, only to face a choice between 
two depressing realities?62
Some believe that better communications of climate 
science can help change minds by better explaining the 
complexities and uncertainties of climate science in a more 
familiar context. For example, the notion of insurance has 
sometimes been invoked as a metaphor for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions in the present, whereby humanity 
would spend some money now, akin to insurance premiums, to 
 The high costs of trying to avoid 
climate change, coupled with the scientific complexities and 
uncertainties, make a compelling case for rational denial. 
 
 62. It has been argued that in a selfish sense, it is rational to avoid the pain of 
reducing greenhouse gases now, on the grounds that centuries of economic history 
suggest that the future generations that will have to deal with climate change will 
be much wealthier than the current one. This argument has been made by 
Thomas Schelling, Intergenerational Discounting, 23 ENERGY POL’Y 395, 398 
(1995) (“I conclude that most of us will want to discount or depreciate heavily the 
extra consumption provided for (or conserved for) descendants of the current 
population, because they are likely to be better off . . . .”). However, it has been 
counter-argued that this is a risky approach because there is a small (as far as we 
currently know) but significant chance that climate change could have such 
catastrophic consequences that future generations might not be wealthier after 
all. See, e.g., STERN, supra note 1, at 162–63; see also Thomas Sterner & U. 
Martin Persson, An Even Sterner Review: Introducing Relative Prices into the 
Discounting Debate, 2 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 61, 62 (2008). 
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address the risk of climate change in the future.63 A collection 
of prominent climate and social scientists have called for a 
nonpartisan climate communications initiative to take on some 
of the intermediary role of interpretation.64
Other reforms and oversights have been proposed to 
bolster the credibility of climate science. In the wake of the few 
but embarrassing errors in the IPCC Fourth Assessment 
report, the United Nations created an independent panel to 
review IPCC procedures for transparency and credibility.
 Too much 
discussion of Climategate and other putative scandals has 
taken on the air of self-defense, which has detracted from 
discussion of the underlying issues. The thinking would be that 
a separate communications body that is less personally 
involved with the science itself may have more success focusing 
the discussion on the science rather than the processes that 
have been impugned by Climategate and climate skeptics. 
65 The 
panel concurred with the IPCC’s scientific conclusions but was 
critical of its procedures.66 Universities have also investigated 
claims against their faculty members accused of manipulating 
data.67
Unsurprisingly, none of these measures have mollified 
critics or climate skeptics.
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 63. EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU ACTION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE: LEADING 
GLOBAL ACTION TO 2020 AND BEYOND 7 (2008) (“This is a small price to pay to 
insure ourselves against dangerous levels of climate change.”); Martin L. 
Weitzman, GHG Targets as Insurance Against Catastrophic Climate Damages 2 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16136, 2010); Stephanie 
Doster, Leading UA Scholars Say Early Action Is Best “Insurance Policy” Against 
Climate Change, U. ARIZ. INST. ENV’T (Jan. 12, 2006), 
http://www.environment.arizona. 
edu/news/early-action. 
 It would be fanciful to think that 
this kind of fiat would change anybody’s mind. It has been 
simple for climate skeptics to attack the review panels in much 
the same way that they have attacked climate science: that the 
 64. Thomas E. Bowman et al., Time to Take Action on Climate 
Communication, 330 SCIENCE 1044 (2010). 
 65. Members of UN Climate Oversight Panel Announced, UNITED NATIONS 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL LIAISON SERVICE (May 5, 2010), http://www.un-
ngls.org/spip.php?article2419. 
 66. Morello, supra note 54. 
 67. See, e.g., THE PA. STATE UNIV., RA-10 FINAL INVESTIGATION REPORT 
INVOLVING DR. MICHAEL E. MANN (2010), available at http://live.psu.edu/fullimg/ 
userpics/10026/Final_Investigation_Report.pdf; RUSSELL ET AL., supra note 16. 
 68. For example, Senator Inhofe and others still plan to investigate the IPCC. 
CRU CONTROVERSY, supra note 53; see also Lauren Morello, ‘Climategate’ Inquiry 
Vindicates Scientists, CLIMATEWIRE (July 8, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/ 
climatewire/print/2010/07/08/2 (paid subscription). 
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outcomes were pre-ordained, and that the climate conspiracy 
includes those who are asked to provide oversight.69
II. PREDICTION MARKETS 
 It is hard 
to escape the conclusion that climate skeptics will never be 
convinced by institutional adjustments aimed at making 
climate science more credible and that these skeptics will find 
fodder in efforts to increase transparency. This Article thus 
advocates an entirely different path for evaluating climate 
science and proposes to draw on an institution that is truly 
independent: the market. 
Talk is cheap. Predictions are very cheap. In the public 
world of climate science, talk and predictions are not only 
cheap—they are frequently valueless, issued as they are by 
individuals and organizations with self-serving agendas and on 
the basis of questionable information. Quality climate science 
(and reasonable climate skepticism) is mixed with too much 
ideology, creating an ill broth containing very little 
informational nutrition. 
There is an institution that, while currently suffering 
through a period of disapproval, is thought to be apolitical and 
may still be more confidence-inspiring than climate scientists: 
the market. The recent global financial downturn has called 
into question the accuracy of market prices as an indicator of 
value. The rational expectations hypothesis70 and the efficient 
markets hypothesis,71
 
 69. Climate skeptic Steve McIntyre has lambasted a review of the 
Climategate emails, chaired by Sir Muir Russell, in a number of entries in his 
Climate Audit blog. See, e.g., Steve McIntyre, “Without Oversight or Challenge,” 
CLIMATE AUDIT (Oct. 26, 2010), http://climateaudit.org/2010/10/26/without-
oversight-or-challenge; Steve McIntyre, UEA “Welcomes” Untrue Muir Russell 
Findings, CLIMATE AUDIT (Sept. 11, 2010), http://climateaudit.org/2010/09/11/uea-
welcomes-untrue-muir-russell-finding; Steve McIntyre, Blatant Misrepresentation 
by Muir Russell Panel, CLIMATE AUDIT (July 22, 2010), 
http://climateaudit.org/2010/07/22/blatant-misrepresentation-by-muir-russell-
panel; Steve McIntyre, Muir Russell—What I’ll Be Looking for, CLIMATE AUDIT 
(July 6, 2010), http://climateaudit.org/2010/07/06/muir-russell-what-ill-be-looking-
for (“I don’t expect the Muir Russell report to be as much of an insult to the public 
as the Penn State report or the Oxburgh report—both of which set the bar pretty 
low.”). 
 ideological and intellectual beacons for 
 70. Robert E. Lucas, Expectations and the Neutrality of Money, 4 J. ECON. 
THEORY 103 (1972); John F. Muth, Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price 
Movements, 29 ECONOMETRICA 315 (1961). 
 71. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and 
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). 
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market enthusiasts, are obviously under attack.72 Robert 
Schiller’s 2000 book Irrational Exuberance,73 prescient in its 
understanding of the delirious overvaluations of the dot-com 
bubble, was published in a second edition in 2005,74 just in 
time to drop hints of the real estate asset bubble that sunk 
world markets in 2009. Combined with the Enron scandal 
earlier this century, in which accounting tricks were parlayed 
into artificially inflated share prices,75 traumatic market 
plunges have cast doubt about whether markets are to be 
trusted at all. Behavioral economists have long studied 
systemic divergences from rationality, but it seems that the 
accumulation of market travails has made it fashionable to find 
not just exceptions to the rational expectations hypothesis and 
the efficient markets hypothesis, but to declare that they are 
“dead” and utterly useless as descriptive theories.76
This is hyperbole. No reasonable person doubts that 
markets still largely work. It would be callous to ignore the 
individual retirement portfolios that have been wrecked by 
stock market swings, but by and large, investors still entrust 
the stock market with large chunks of their individual wealth. 
Every time stock markets have plunged on the heels of a 
bursting bubble, investors have eventually returned. And 
bursting bubbles have only spurred calls for regulation; nobody 
believes that markets inherently do a poor job of allocating 
capital, at least as compared with the alternatives. 
 
Most importantly for climate science, markets have always 
been very effective in knitting together disparate pieces of 
information and transmitting them in the pithy singularity of a 
price. If well-designed, markets are capable of collecting, 
filtering, and processing a huge amount of information of 
varying quality. An illustrative essay by libertarian icon 
Leonard Read,77 I, Pencil,78
 
 72. John Quiggin, Rational Manias, OUT OF THE CROOKED TIMBER (July 19, 
2004), http://crookedtimber.org/2004/07/19/rational-manias; David Wighton, 
Efficient Market Hypothesis Is Dead—For Now, THE TIMES (Jan. 29, 2009), 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/columnists/article5607960.ece. 
 concerns the genealogy of a pencil. 
 73. ROBERT J. SCHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000). 
 74. ROBERT J. SCHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2d ed. 2005). 
 75. See, e.g., FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK 
CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 302–04 (2003). 
 76. See Wighton, supra note 72. 
 77. Read was also the founder of the Foundation for Economic Education. A 
Tradition of Freedom, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC., http://www.fee.org/office/a-
tradition-of-freedom (last visited July 5, 2011). 
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The reason that Read devotes an essay to the lowly pencil is 
that there is such a huge number of economic factors that 
determine how many pencils are made. At one time, one and a 
half billion pencils were made every year in factories in San 
Leandro, California, and the markets that determined their 
production levels were (and remain) enormously complex.79 
Even a simple pencil has a huge number of inputs, including 
the wood from cedar trees and the graphite (then mined in 
Ceylon) and the clay (then brought into California from 
Mississippi) used to make the pencil “lead.”80 There are the 
labor inputs as well: the labor at the mills, the power plants 
powering the California pencil factories, and the coffee shops 
frequented by truckers hauling cedar logs from Oregon to 
California sawmills.81
The ability to buy and sell in different quantities also 
allows markets to weight information in accordance to its 
significance and credibility. If a large retailer that sells school 
supplies such as Staples or Office Depot were to negotiate a 
contract for pencils, its negotiated prices would likely reflect a 
great deal of information and research about the competitive 
price of pencils. Such a contract would thus likely be both an 
important (due to the market size of the retailer) and a credible 
(due to the likelihood that it negotiated a realistic price) source 
of information. 
 All of these labor and material inputs 
have competing uses. The point of Read’s essay is that all of the 
countless allocative decisions made during the course of the 
manufacturing of a pencil are implicitly made by prices, which 
signify the scarcity of a commodity or worker and the 
importance of competing uses. Market prices, in 
communicating scarcity, collect, filter, and process the 
countless pieces of information that go into an implicit, 
decentralized allocation of resources. 
As Michael Abramowicz explains in his book Predictocracy: 
Market Mechanisms for Public and Private Decision Making,82
 
 78. Leonard Read, I, Pencil: My Family Tree as Told to Leonard Read, LIBR. 
ECON. & LIBERTY (Dec. 1958), http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/rdPncl1.html. 
 
markets can also be harnessed to provide non-financial 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET MECHANISMS FOR 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DECISION MAKING (2007). For another review of prediction 
markets, see Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, 18 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 107 (2004). 
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information to improve public decision-making. A prediction 
market is a constructed market in which trades are made on 
contracts that specify payouts based on specific outcomes. 
Participating in a prediction market is betting on outcomes. 
Depending on the type of prediction market, “shares” of an 
outcome are bought and sold so that the trading prices reflect 
expectations about the likelihood of that specific outcome 
ultimately taking place. As briefly noted above, perhaps the 
best known of the examples of prediction markets are housed 
at the Iowa Electronic Markets project,83 which for decades has 
accurately predicted, among other things, political election 
outcomes. In the Iowa Electronic Markets project, trading in 
presidential prediction markets can take place on a “winner-
take-all” basis, which involves only binary outcomes 
(Republican or Democrat winning the Presidency) in which the 
traded contracts pay out the full amount if the outcome occurs 
and nothing if it doesn’t. Thus, an “Obama share” after the 
2008 presidential election was worth the full payout amount, 
and a “McCain share” was worth nothing. Alternatively, 
trading can take place on a “share” basis, in which the specified 
payout is indexed to a continuous number, such as the popular 
vote share, so that an Obama share was worth fifty-three cents 
on the dollar after the election, while a McCain share was 
worth forty-seven cents on the dollar.84 Either way, trade 
prices leading up to elections reflect broad expectations about 
the outcome. As Abramowicz has argued, prediction markets 
are best justified by the fact that in a prediction market, 
“traders can profit from information suggesting that the 
market price is wrong.”85
The Iowa Electronic Markets project—which has operated 
to predict a wide variety of outcomes, including many political 
elections (not just presidential)—has generally been more 
accurate than polls, and considerably less volatile.
 In this way, prediction markets 
harness disparate pieces of information and aggregate them 
into the price. 
86
 
 83. IEM PROJECT, supra note 
 The reason 
6. 
 84. Popular Vote in the 2008 Presidential Election, HISTORYCENTRAL.COM, 
http://www.historycentral.com/elections/12008/popularvote2008.html (last visited 
Dec. 7, 2010). 
 85. ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 82, at 15. 
 86. See, e.g., JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 17–19 (2004); 
Joyce Berg et al., Results from a Dozen Years of Election Futures Markets 
Research, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS RESULTS 742, 748 
(Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2008); Joyce E. Berg, Forrest D. Nelson 
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for this is that a prediction market like the Iowa Electronic 
Markets project seems to do a better job of evaluating the value 
of new information.87 For example, while a poll errantly 
captures the emotional “bump” after, say, a party’s nominating 
convention, a prediction market is likely to have factored into 
its price the ultimate value of such an anticipated event.88
But Abramowicz argues that much more information could 
be mined for a variety of other purposes. Hewlett-Packard and 
Eli Lilly, huge companies with critical decisions to make about 
product lines, have set up internal (i.e., employee) prediction 
markets to predict future printer sales (in the case of HP) and 
future pharmaceutical sales (in the case of Eli Lilly).
 
Prediction markets generally do not get excited and overreact. 
89 They 
were remarkably effective in identifying which products were 
likely to succeed in the marketplace.90 Most relevant for 
purposes of this Article, prediction markets can be used to help 
formulate public policy. Among the public policy applications 
for prediction markets that Abramowicz calls for are prediction 
markets for defense and anti-terrorism policy,91 fiscal policy,92 
banking regulation,93 and mine safety regulation.94 In all of 
these cases, Abramowicz argues, prediction markets have 
advantages over more traditional policymaking processes 
because of the potential for the markets to harness information 
from disaggregated and informed market participants.95
Abramowicz’s suggestion of using prediction markets to 
predict the number of injuries and deaths at particular mines 
seems especially prescient in light of the 2010 explosion of a 
Massey Energy-operated Upper Big Branch mine in West 
Virginia that killed twenty-nine miners, the worst mine 
explosion in the United States since 1970.
 
96
 
& Thomas A. Rietz, Prediction Market Accuracy in the Long Run, 24 INT’L. J. 
FORECASTING 285 (2008). 
 During the 
 87. Oleg Bondarenko & Peter Bossaerts, Expectations and Learning in Iowa, 
24 J. BANKING & FIN. 1535, 1547–48 (2000). 
 88. Berg, Nelson & Rietz, supra note 86, at 293. 
 89. SUROWIECKI, supra note 86, at 221. 
 90. Id. 
 91. ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 82, at 46–49. 
 92. Id. at 62–63. 
 93. Id. at 148–49. 
 94. Id. at 151. 
 95. Id. at 282. 
 96. Greg Bluestein & Vicki Smith, Mine Rescue Effort Turns to Recovery, 
MSNBC.COM (Apr. 10, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36183425/ 
ns/us_news-life. 
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ensuing investigation, Massey Energy disputed accounts of the 
Mining Safety and Health Administration officials who cited 
past violations and illegally high levels of coal dust in the mine 
at the time of the explosion as causes of the explosion.97 While 
prediction markets in these kinds of tragic events have been 
condemned as “people profiting from terrible things 
happening,”98
In appreciating the vast information network embodied in 
market prices, it becomes apparent how markets can play a 
role in aggregating and weighting the disparate pieces of 
climate science. This Article proposes to set up a prediction 
market for future climate outcomes by linking a carbon tax to 
climate outcomes and then establishing a market for tradable 
permits to emit CO2; these permits would be unitary 
exemptions from the carbon tax. If greenhouse gas emitters 
needed information about future climate conditions—as they 
would under this proposal in order to evaluate their potential 
future carbon tax liabilities—they would become effective 
collectors of climate information. Together with other emitters 
that face a potential carbon tax liability, they would likely form 
a network of gatherers of climate information. While many 
amateur climate wonks would continue to pore through reams 
of daily climate reports, the evaluations of emitting firms 
would likely take on central importance. 
 it is worth wondering about the following 
proposition: Might a prediction market in safety violations (or 
even injuries) at specific mines—a market that could have 
drawn in mining experts with important local knowledge about 
the Upper Big Branch mine—have saved the lives of the 29 
miners killed in the Massey explosion? 
In addition, prediction markets, like markets generally, 
weight the value of information by allowing market 
participants to vary the amount of money invested. This allows 
prediction market participants to place a premium on 
information that they believe to be especially important or 
credible and likely to change the expectation of an outcome. 
This kind of weighting is difficult with an opinion poll. Even 
 
 97. Kimberly Kindy, Probe into Fatal W.V. Mine Explosion Finds Large 
Amounts of Volatile Coal Dust, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/17/ 
AR2010091704242.html. 
 98. SUROWIECKI, supra note 86, at 80; see also ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 82, at 
47 (both discussing political criticism of prediction markets that would have 
allowed trading in events in the Middle East including—but not limited to—
terrorist attacks). 
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surveys that provide a rating scale are vulnerable to variations 
in how different people express their opinions. 
Perhaps most importantly, a prediction market in future 
climate conditions would force market participants—in the first 
instance, emitters of greenhouse gases that face a future 
carbon tax liability—to be extremely discerning consumers of 
climate science, critically evaluating climate science and the 
critiques offered by climate skeptics. While some emitters may 
have an ideological axe to grind in terms of climate policy, it 
would turn out to be very expensive to allow an ideological 
filter to affect their valuations of different pieces of climate 
science. For example, one study showed that while the majority 
of participants in a prediction market for the 1988 presidential 
election were Republican, the predicted outcome was not 
ideologically skewed toward a Republican result but accurately 
predicted the margin of victory by President George H.W. Bush 
over Michael Dukakis in 1988.99 Talk is cheap, but prediction 
markets force participants to back their stated beliefs with 
money, forcing a person to, as Abramowicz puts it, “put[] his 
money where his mouth is.”100
III. THE TAX-AND-CAP-AND-TRADE PROPOSAL 
 In the world of climate change, 
climate scientists and climate skeptics alike can, instead of 
lobbing rhetorical grenades at the other, profit by trading on 
what they believe is superior information. It would not be 
Pollyannaish to imagine that some of the vitriol characterizing 
climate debate could be displaced by a discussion of whether 
the market price for future emissions permits is too high or too 
low. Complaints that the market price reflects too much 
optimism or too much pessimism about future climate 
outcomes could be met with the advice to go buy or sell some 
emissions permits. 
The proposal in this Article builds upon two other works. 
First, Professor Abramowicz’s Predictocracy features 
prominently and obviously in this proposal and its policy 
justifications. Second, economist Ross McKitrick has proposed 
 
 99. Robert Forsythe et al., Anatomy of an Experimental Political Stock 
Market, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 1142, 1155–56 (1992). 
 100. ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 82, at 8. 
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an important precursor to this proposal: a temperature-indexed 
carbon tax.101
McKitrick proposed the idea of a temperature-indexed 
carbon tax in part as a way of introducing a different “referee” 
for climate science.
 
102 If temperatures increase, the level of the 
carbon tax goes up.103
The only people who lose will be those whose positions were 
disingenuous, such as opponents of greenhouse policy who 
claim to be skeptical while privately believing greenhouse 
warming is a crisis, or proponents of greenhouse gas 
emission cuts who neither understand nor believe the 
I.P.C.C. projections, but invoke them as a convenient 
argument on behalf of policies they want on other grounds 
even if global warming turns out to be untrue.
 As McKitrick, a climate skeptic, told 
New York Times columnist John Tierney: 
104
McKitrick’s clever (and admirably constructive) proposal 
should be received with several caveats. First, a temperature-
indexed carbon tax should not be viewed as a way of neatly 
internalizing the cost of CO2 emissions. I have argued in my 
other work
 
105 that a carbon tax is an imperfect, though a first 
and necessary, step toward creating an effective carbon price. 
Given the current vast and profound disagreements over the 
appropriate price of carbon,106
Second, McKitrick’s model limits the degree to which 
temperature could be a nonlinear function of emissions.
 however, it seems unrealistic to 
believe that any one-to-one correspondence between damages 
and contemporaneous temperature measurements could be 
agreed upon. This caveat is not specific, of course, to 
McKitrick’s proposal. 
107
 
 101. See Ross McKitrick, A Simple State-Contingent Pricing Rule for Complex 
Intertemporal Externalities, 33 ENERGY ECON. 111 (2011). The implementation of 
a temperature-indexed carbon tax would be based upon the impartial, non-
manipulable reporting of an increase in tropical temperatures. 
 This 
 102. John Tierney, Trusting Nature as the Climate Referee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
15, 2009, at D1. 
 103. McKitrick, supra note 101, at 111. 
 104. Tierney, supra note 102. 
 105. SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST OUR HANG-
UPS TO EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY (2011). 
 106. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 107. McKitrick, supra note 101, at 113. McKitrick’s model also imposes an 
assumption of symmetry, which requires that a lagged marginal effect of 
emissions on temperature be the same no matter what the year. In other words, 
while temperature may be more influenced by some years than others, the 
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is problematic, since it is widely believed among climate 
scientists that nonlinearities may exist in a relationship 
between emissions and temperature because of a number of 
potential tipping points, or “thresholds,” that may exist beyond 
which some runaway positive feedbacks could suddenly change 
the state of the Earth’s climate.108
The final caveat to McKitrick’s proposal pertains to his 
temperature index, which he proposes should be a mean 
annual temperature for the tropical troposphere (the upper 
atmospheric layers above the band of Earth between twenty 
degrees north and south of the Equator).
 It seems problematic to 
assume that even in short periods of time, the relationship 
between temperature and emissions could not change quickly. 
109 McKitrick offers a 
reasonable argument that instead of the more intuitive global 
mean temperature, tropical tropospheric temperature offers 
better data and a more stable signal.110
Expanding on this last caveat, this Article proposes a more 
general policy of indexing a carbon tax to not just one 
temperature but a broader set of non-manipulable climate 
outcomes. A broader “basket” of climate outcomes, not unlike a 
consumer price index, might be devised to be a better indicator 
of the state of the Earth’s climate. The effects of climate change 
on humankind are not necessarily limited to a change in the 
global mean temperature, though that change in itself is likely 
a very good proxy for many indirectly harmful effects on 
humankind, such as those affecting sensitive species and 
ecosystems. But in thinking about what is directly and 
immediately worrisome about climate change, a number of 
 But while this might 
serve as a reasonable climate “referee,” it would not necessarily 
be a good barometer of the state of the Earth’s climate, 
statically or over a long period of time. A single tropical 
temperature reading would obscure, among other things, an 
increase in extremes that could cancel each out when averaged. 
 
influence of emissions on temperature ten years (for example) hence will always 
be the same, no matter the year. Id. 
 108. See, e.g., Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the 
Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 13 (2009) 
(citing and analyzing Margaret S. Torn & John Harte, Missing Feedbacks, 
Asymmetric Uncertainties, and the Underestimation of Future Warming, 33 
GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L10703 (2006)); see also H. Damon Matthews & 
David W. Keith, Carbon-Cycle Feedbacks Increase the Likelihood of a Warmer 
Future, 34 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L09702, 1 (2007). 
 109. McKitrick, supra note 101, at 117–18. 
 110. See id. 
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other climatic effects leap to mind: (1) temperature extremes, so 
that there will be more extremely hot days that could prove 
fatal to vulnerable populations and result in forest dieback111 
and forest fires; (2) the possibility of more intense hurricanes 
and tropical storms; (3) the intensification of hydrological 
cycles, with the dual results that precipitation would become 
more intense (and less manageable, leading to more flooding 
and less water storage capability) and droughts would last 
longer and be more severe; (4) sea level rises; and (5) ocean 
acidification. All of these effects are thought to be (though not 
uncontroversially) among the potential and anticipated effects 
of climate change, and absent a successful geo-engineering 
effort112 they are outcomes that are non-manipulable. All of 
these effects are directly relatable to significant damages, 
though adaptation efforts113 may alleviate some of the 
damages. For example, developed countries such as the United 
States could clearly do a better job of protecting their most 
vulnerable populations from heat waves. All of these climatic 
events are monitored internationally, routinely, and reliably so 
that even in remote parts of the planet weather anomalies are 
susceptible to measurement and counting.114
 
 111. Forest “dieback” is the term for unnatural tree mortality due to 
environmental stress. See Oliver L. Phillips et al., Drought Sensitivity of the 
Amazon Rainforest, 323 SCIENCE 1344, 1344 (2009). 
 Some details on 
 112. “Geo-engineering” is a general term used to describe a wide variety of 
measures aimed at reducing the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases, 
post-combustion or post-release, sometimes by directly removing greenhouse 
gases from the atmosphere or reducing the amount of solar radiation that reaches 
the Earth. For example, one frequently debated idea involves the promotion of 
ocean algal growth, or “ocean fertilization,” which would promote the absorption 
of CO2 but would also have numerous side-effects for ocean biology and chemistry. 
Global Envtl. Alert Serv., Geoengineering to Combat Global Warming, UNITED 
NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME (May 2011), http://na.unep.net/geas/newsletter/May_ 
11.html. A much more innocuous form of geo-engineering involves painting roofs 
white to reflect sunlight. Id. For a general discussion of geo-engineering, see 
HENSON, supra note 48, at 330. This article discusses geo-engineering infra Part 
IV.E. 
 113. “Adaptation” is a general term used to describe all forms of adjustment to 
a climate-changed world that societies may undertake, now and in the future. See 
HENSON, supra note 48, at 299. For example, building sea walls is a way of 
adapting to higher sea levels and has been frequently discussed as a way of 
protecting New York City from sea level rises. Launch a Citywide Strategic 
Planning Process for Climate Change Adaptation, PLANYC 2030, http://prtl-prd-
web.nyc.gov/html/ 
planyc2030/html/plan/climate_citywide.shtml (last visited July 6, 2011). 
 114. See, e.g., GISS Surface Temperature Analysis, GODDARD INST. FOR SPACE 
STUD., NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., http://data.giss.nasa.gov/ 
gistemp/graphs (last modified July 15, 2011) (monitoring global temperatures); 
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exactly how this index would be constructed are discussed in 
Part IV, infra. 
But there is even more that can be done with the idea of an 
indexed carbon tax. There is no reason to limit the amount of 
information created by market transactions to 
contemporaneous climate conditions. Because current 
emissions will contribute to higher future temperatures for 
centuries,115 it is important to obtain and evaluate—right 
now—climate science about future conditions. Professor 
McKitrick’s indexed carbon tax would do this, but the signal 
would not be very clear. A temperature-indexed carbon tax, 
provided that a government is sufficiently committed to 
maintaining it for a long period of time, would induce emitters 
to plan for the future and undertake capital investments that 
reflect their expectations about what the future temperature 
will be. When the American Electric Power Company (AEP), 
the largest CO2 emitter in the world,116
 
Global Historical Climatology Network Gridded Products, NAT’L CLIMATIC DATA 
CENTER, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://lwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/temp-
and-precip/ghcn-gridded-prcp.html (last updated May 16, 2011) (mapping 
temperature and precipitation anomalies); Hurricane/Tropical Data, UNISYS, 
http://weather.unisys.com/hurricane (last visited Sept. 26, 2010) (providing data 
on hurricanes and tropical storms); Integrated SST Data Products, GROUP FOR 
HIGH-RESOL. SEA SURFACE TEMPERATURE, http://www.ghrsst.org (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2010) (providing products to monitor sea surface temperature); INT’L 
SATELLITE CLOUD CLIMATOLOGY PROJECT, http://isccp.giss.nasa.gov/index.html 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2010) (featuring data on clouds); Overview of WCRP Climate 
Extremes Research, CLIMATE VARIABILITY & PREDICTABILITY, 
http://www.clivar.org/organization/extremes/extremes.php (last updated Nov. 11, 
2010) (providing data on ocean surface and upper ocean thermal temperatures 
and global wind data); State of the Climate: Global Hazards—August 2010, NAT’L 
CLIMATIC DATA CENTER, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Sept. 2010), 
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/hazards/2010/8 (featuring rainfall and flooding 
data, drought, and extreme weather events). 
 invests in renewable 
energy sources such as wind farms, there could well be a 
reasonable inference that it anticipates a higher temperature 
in the future. But the signal would be muddled. AEP has, in 
fact, been investing heavily in renewable energy sources and 
 115. Carbon dioxide has had a residence in the Earth’s atmosphere for 
hundreds of years, meaning that emissions of CO2 now will form part of the 
Earth’s stock of greenhouse gases for millennia, unless that CO2 is removed 
somehow. See IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT, supra note 26, at 125–26. 
 116. This conclusion is derived from running a query on an Excel spreadsheet 
that is downloadable from the website of the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency’s “eGRID” project. Clean Energy, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/egrid (click on “eGRID2007 year 2005 plant and 
aggregation files (ZIP)” to download spreadsheet) (last visited Dec. 13, 2010). 
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carbon capture and storage technology.117
There is thus a second part to this proposal: a cap-and-
trade program for permits to emit a ton of CO2 in future years, 
the exercise of which would displace the carbon tax liability for 
emitting one ton of CO2. Under this second part of the proposal, 
a batch of permits for each of many future years
 But the primary 
reason for AEP’s move towards renewable energies is almost 
certainly to begin to prepare a behemoth company for a future 
regulatory environment that will price CO2 emissions. Teasing 
out the impact of an indexed carbon tax from AEP’s other 
strategic decisions would be difficult. Thus, something over and 
above the observation of capital investments made putatively 
in anticipation of a future tax liability is needed. 
118 will be 
auctioned off every year. Once auctioned, the permits would be 
tradable until, of course, they are exercised in the year of their 
designated vintage. Permits can be redeemed by whoever is 
subject to the carbon tax, but trading can take place among any 
interested parties. Emissions permit-trading is now a familiar 
part of environmental law, having formed the basis of the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments and its pioneering cap-and-trade 
program for permits to emit sulfur dioxide.119 Until recently, 
when the failure of the U.S. Congress to pass climate 
legislation torpedoed any potential for carbon credit trading, 
carbon credits were traded on the Chicago Climate 
Exchange.120
This second part of the proposal induces emitters to 
forecast their own future carbon tax liabilities and reveal their 
 The motivation for this part of the proposal is to 
tie market activity in tradable permits to future climate 
outcomes and thereby create a market for information about 
future climate outcomes. If emitters with future carbon tax 
liability are rational and risk-neutral, they should be willing to 
pay for tradable permits a price just slightly less than their 
anticipated liability under the indexed carbon tax. 
 
 117. AEP Doubles Renewable Energy Goal to 2,000 MW, RENEWABLE ENERGY 
WORLD (Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/ 
2009/04/aep-doubles-renewable-energy-goal-to-2000-mw. 
 118. The issue of how many years in advance permits will be available is 
discussed infra Part IV.B.2. 
 119. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (1994). 
 120. Markets, CHI. CLIMATE EXCHANGE, https://www.theice.com/ccx.jhtml (last 
visited July 6, 2011). Carbon trading has been suspended in light of the failure of 
the United States to pass cap-and-trade legislation, or any climate policy at all for 
that matter. Dwindling Interest to Shutter Chicago Climate Exchange, 
GREENWIRE (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2010/11/17/8 
(paid subscription). 
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forecasts through the exchange of tradable permits. Such 
private forecasts are not oracles, of course. But the level of 
private concern over future climate conditions, as expressed 
through market prices for permits, is at least an unbiased 
opinion derived from self-interest. The price bid by emitters for, 
say, permits to emit in 2020 would speak volumes about 
private expectations of the consequences of climate change. 
Moreover, this information would be free of suspicions of 
conspiracies by climate scientists to shore up their research 
grant fiefdoms121 or desires by radical environmentalists who 
really wish to use climate change as an excuse for imposing 
environmental restrictions.122
There is one final benefit of this tax-and-cap-and-trade 
proposal that is worth emphasizing, as it achieves something 
unprecedented in both enhancing climate science and 
accomplishing something far more effectively than any 
previous prediction market has accomplished. This proposal 
would create a private market for information and information 
processing about climate outcomes. Clearly, emitters with 
future carbon tax liabilities do not have, and would be unlikely 
to develop, the internal capacity to do their own climate 
outcome projections. At the same time, a carbon tax liability 
that is tied to future climate outcomes would compel most 
emitters to invest some money to investigate the likely extent 
of their liabilities. This could constitute a major source of 
funding for a new climate information market. 
 The market price is a far 
stronger and clearer signal of future expectations than what 
would probably be mostly anecdotal information concerning 
which firms are worried about and planning for rising 
temperature taxes. 
Those with direct and first-hand information about climate 
science—mostly climate scientists, but other highly interested 
climate change wonks as well—would likely buy and sell 
permits, aggregating information in an important manner 
along the way. But by and large, the most important traders in 
a market for permits issued under this proposal will be those 
CO2 emitters, such as AEP, that may have to rely on the 
 
 121. See Roy W. Spencer, On the House Vote to Defund the IPCC, ROY 
SPENCER, PH. D. (Feb. 19, 2011), http://www.drroyspencer.com/2011/02/on-the-
house-vote-to-defund-the-ipcc (“The perpetual supply of climate change research 
money also biases them. Everyone in my business knows that as long as 
manmade climate change remains a serious threat, the money will continue to 
flow, and climate programs will continue to grow.”). 
 122. See supra text accompanying note 104. 
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permits for their future compliance with a carbon tax scheme. 
In 2005, AEP emitted approximately 161 million tons of CO2;123 
if one assumed a very modest carbon tax that was set to five 
dollars per ton at current climate outcomes,124 AEP’s annual 
carbon tax liability would be about $805 million. If climate 
outcomes increased by, say, twenty-five percent, its annual 
carbon tax liability would top one billion dollars. All 101 
electricity generators in the EPA’s eGRID database would have 
a combined current carbon tax liability (assuming a rate of five 
dollars per ton of CO2125) of $8.75 billion.126
Because of the amounts of money involved, it is the 
participation of large emitters in a cap-and-trade program for 
emissions futures that is likely to make or break the credibility 
of climate science. In essence, this proposal uses markets to 
turn the evaluation of climate science over to those emitters 
that will potentially rely on those permits for their emitting 
operations. Environmental advocates may chafe at the notion 
that the greatest greenhouse gas emitters will have such a 
large say in evaluating the quality of climate science, but $8.75 
billion is a lot of impetus for honestly evaluating climate 
science. As for the prickly personalities that debate climate 
science, Professor McKitrick and other climate skeptics would 
no doubt be pleased that those guilty of deceit or of shoddy 
climate science would be punished by being ignored. 
 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND THE REALPOLITIK OF 
CARBON TAXES 
As is the case with all legal policy, the devil is in the 
details. Whether this proposal succeeds in lending clarity and 
cohesiveness to climate science, and whether it succeeds in 
generating new climate information, depends vitally on how it 
is carried out. This Article does not set out to produce a 
finished, policy-ready proposal, so some details are left to 
future work. But some principles and considerations are set out 
here to guide future development and implementation of this 
proposal. Sections A and B in this Part set out the key 
 
 123. Clean Energy, supra note 116. 
 124. See infra Part IV.A.2 for discussion of setting the tax. 
 125. eGRID also measures methane emissions, which could provide a means 
for expanding the carbon tax to include methane emissions. Clean Energy, supra 
note 116. 
 126. Id. 
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parameters in setting up the indexed carbon tax and the cap-
and-trade program, respectively. This includes a critical 
discussion of the climate outcomes that would be made a part 
of the index, leaving some of the details for the Appendix. 
Sections C through E address critical questions that pertain to 
the effectiveness of this program. In closing out this Part, 
Section F addresses some of the political obstacles faced by this 
proposal. 
A. Establishing the Carbon Tax 
Implementing a carbon tax is, as I have argued in my other 
work, generally easier than setting up a cap-and-trade 
program.127
1. Who Is Subject to the Tax? 
 Two fundamental questions, however, must be 
answered: Who will be subject to the tax, and how should the 
tax level be set? This proposal, as well, must answer a third 
critical question: What climate outcomes should be included in 
the index that determines the level of the carbon tax? This 
Section addresses these questions. 
A carbon tax is a liability based upon the quantity of CO2 
emitted, generally as a tax per ton of CO2 emitted. The carbon 
tax would be levied at some point along the chain of 
distribution of fossil fuels, the main fossil fuels being coal, 
natural gas, and petroleum, which account for nearly eighty 
percent of all greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S.128 Where 
should the carbon tax be levied? There are a number of options. 
The cleanest option is to require permits far upstream, where 
(1) coal is mined, (2) natural gas is processed, (3) petroleum is 
refined, and (4) each of these fossil fuels is imported.129
 
 127. HSU, supra note 
 By 
imposing the tax upstream, comprehensive regulation can be 
achieved by taxing (or requiring permits of) a relatively small 
105, at 87–88. 
 128. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2009, at ES-4 to ES-6 tbl.ES-2 (2011) [hereinafter 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS], available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ 
emissions/downloads11/US-GHG-Inventory-2011-Complete_Report.pdf 
(illustrating that of 6633.2 million metric tons of emissions, 5209.0 come from 
fossil fuel combustion). 
 129. This proposal was most recently made by Gilbert E. Metcalf & David 
Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 501 (2009). 
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number of entities in the United States130: 148 petroleum 
refineries,131 1,407 coal mines,132 530 natural gas processors,133 
and points of importation. Fortunately, as an economic matter, 
absent transaction and enforcement costs, the economic effects 
of an upstream carbon tax (or cap-and-trade program) can be 
demonstrated to be the same as a similarly comprehensive 
downstream carbon tax (or cap-and-trade program), where the 
price is levied on the end user.134 For heavily regulated and 
efficiently traded energy commodities, tax burdens are passed 
up and down the chain of distribution with little friction. 
Moreover, the administrative costs are considerably less for 
upstream programs.135 Pulling Canadian entities into this 
program would be a sensible extension for a country with a 
closely integrated energy infrastructure that is accustomed to 
being a climate change policy-taker anyway.136
A carbon tax could also, likely without much trouble and 
administrative expense, be expanded to include a number of 
other CO2-emitting activities and other heat-trapping 
greenhouse gases.
 
137
 
 130. Originally estimated by Metcalf & Weisbach, id. at 501, a change in the 
number of refineries, coal mines, and natural gas processors does not materially 
change this estimate. 
 It turns out, for example, that “fugitive 
emissions” of CO2 from the cement-making process, those 
related to the chemical process used to grind up raw materials 
into cement, can be estimated with reasonable accuracy from 
 131. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., REFINERY CAPACITY REPORT 1 tbl.1 (2011), 
available at http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/refinerycapacity/refcap11.pdf. 
 132. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL COAL REPORT: 2009 at 13 tbl.1 
(2010), available at http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/coal/page/acr/acr.pdf. 
 133. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NATURAL GAS PROCESSING: THE CRUCIAL 
LINK BETWEEN NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION AND ITS TRANSPORTATION TO MARKET 
6 tbl.1 (2006), available at http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/ 
feature_articles/2006/ngprocess/ngprocess.pdf. 
 134. See, e.g., Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 129, at 523 (“[T]he incidence of a 
tax and its efficiency effects are unrelated to the statutory obligation to remit the 
tax. This means that, in deciding where to impose the tax (choosing the remitting 
entity), one can focus on minimizing collection and monitoring costs while 
ensuring maximum coverage.”). 
 135. Erin T. Mansur, Upstream Versus Downstream Implementation of Climate 
Policy 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16116, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1626605. 
 136. Recently, Environment Canada announced that it would follow the United 
States in promulgating a set of greenhouse gas emissions regulations that the 
United States was implementing pursuant to its Clean Air Act. Canada Might 
Follow U.S. EPA’s Lead on Permitting—Environment Minister, GREENWIRE (Nov. 
29, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2010/11/29/8 (paid 
subscription). 
 137. Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 129, at 537. 
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the amount of lime used in the industrial process.138 Similarly, 
regulating emissions from landfills by requiring the monitoring 
and measurement of emissions of methane, a greenhouse gas 
twenty-five times more powerful than CO2, is thought to be a 
manageable administrative task.139
2. The Carbon Tax Level 
 Imposing a carbon tax on 
cement manufacturers for fugitive emissions and to landfill 
operators for methane emissions would thus appear to be 
reasonable extensions. This proposal can thus be expanded to 
cover a number of other greenhouse gas-emitting activities. 
A carbon tax, as noted above, is a tax levied on a per-ton 
basis. But how much of a tax should be levied on a ton of CO2 
emissions? A Pigouvian140 carbon tax would set the level at the 
amount of marginal social damages for each ton of CO2 
emitted.141 However, the actual, present-value damages of 
climate change over the next hundred years or so are sharply 
disputed among economists studying the economic effect of 
climate change. Estimates are extremely sensitive to a number 
of assumptions, most prominently the appropriate discount 
rate to be used in weighting future costs and benefits.142
 
 138. The statistical accuracy of CO2 estimation methods is plus-or-minus 
thirteen percent, with a ninety-five percent level of confidence. GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS, supra note 
 The 
128, at 4-4 to 4-6; see also Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 
129, at 530. 
 139. Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 129, at 531–32 (“Requiring monitoring of 
all landfills and including their emissions in the tax base should be relatively 
straightforward.”). 
 140. A Pigouvian tax is a unitary tax levied to make an emitter pay for the 
damages caused by its emissions, which are often invisible, or “external,” to the 
emitter. The purpose of a Pigouvian tax is to make emitters face these external, 
invisible costs, or “externalities,” and make them pay—no more, no less. ALFRED 
C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 131–35 (1928). Taxes that reflected the 
extent of negative externalities thus became known as “Pigouvian” taxes. 
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY 21–23 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1975). 
 141. In theory, if the Pigouvian tax were to exactly price the marginal level of 
social damages, the tax rate would vary according to how much marginal damage 
was being imposed, right at that level of emissions. In practice, of course, such a 
floating rate would be administratively infeasible. 
 142. A plethora of modeling assumptions makes a huge difference in marginal 
damages estimates. One of the most influential studies, by William Nordhaus and 
Joseph Boyer, estimated in 2000 that the marginal social damages of the emission 
of one ton of CO2 were $2.48, WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING 
THE WORLD: ECONOMIC MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING 91 tbl.4-10 (2000), an 
estimate that Nordhaus recently upped to about $7.50, WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A 
QUESTION OF BALANCE 90 tbl.5-4 (2008). This contrasts quite dramatically with 
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range of estimates of marginal social damages of a ton of CO2 is 
huge: A 2005 survey found a range of estimates from zero to 
over a thousand dollars per ton.143 The best pair of bookends 
for the disagreement includes one estimate by economist 
William Nordhaus ($7.50 per ton of CO2)144 and another by 
Nicholas Stern, the author of the UK-commissioned Stern 
Review ($85 per ton of CO2).145 Numerous methodological 
differences highlight a sharp intellectual divide between the 
two eminent economists,146
In part because of this, my other work has advocated 
setting a low carbon tax that would be less controversial and 
would serve as just a first step in addressing climate change.
 but more than anything, the divide 
illustrates how challenging it is to try to set a carbon tax at a 
level that economists could agree constitutes a comprehensive 
policy response to climate change. 
147 
Of course, even a small carbon tax is likely to generate political 
heat, but, at least among climate change economists, there is 
likely to be wide agreement that a small carbon tax is better 
than nothing.148
 
the estimate obtained by the UK government-commissioned Stern Review, by 
Nicholas Stern, a former chief economist with the World Bank, which estimated 
current marginal damages at about $85/tCO2 (in year 2000 dollars, to provide a 
comparison with Nordhaus and Boyer). STERN, supra note 
 By the same reasoning, I also recommend that 
1, at 287. A very large 
part of this disparity can be accounted for by the two studies’ difference in 
discount rates. Stern assumes a pure rate of time preference of roughly zero, id. at 
35–37, while Nordhaus uses a more conventional rate of three percent, 
NORDHAUS, supra, at 95. 
 143. Richard S.J. Tol, The Marginal Damage Costs of Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions: An Assessment of the Uncertainties, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 2064, 2068–69 
tbl.2 (2005). 
 144. NORDHAUS, supra note 142, at 90 tbl.5-4. 
 145. STERN, supra note 1, at 287. A primary reason for the difference between 
the two estimates is the difference in assumed discount rates, with Stern using a 
very low discount rate, id. at 35–37, and Nordhaus a more conventional one, 
NORDHAUS, supra note 142, at 95. 
 146. Both Nordhaus and Stern include estimates of the costs of catastrophic 
risks, but Stern assumes higher likelihoods and greater costs. The Stern Review 
includes estimates of non-market impacts, which it describes as “impacts on the 
environment and human health,” STERN, supra note 1, at 161, which would 
include impacts on wildlife and unpriced effects on human health such as 
increased spread of disease due to climatic changes, id. at 293. Nordhaus finds 
these costs a bit speculative. NORDHAUS, supra note 142, at 95. 
 147. HSU, supra note 105, at 29. 
 148. A proposal by three think tanks of varying political orientations, the 
American Enterprise Institute, the Breakthrough Institute, and the Brookings 
Institution, introduced a “post-partisan” proposal after the collapse of climate 
proposals in the U.S. Congress in 2010. The proposal emphasized small subsidies 
and a small carbon tax. STEVEN F. HAYWARD ET AL., POST-PARTISAN POWER: HOW 
A LIMITED AND DIRECT APPROACH TO ENERGY INNOVATION CAN DELIVER CLEAN, 
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this proposal steer as clear as possible of political turmoil by 
initially setting the carbon tax at a low level. This proposal is 
not intended to be a climate policy to end all other policies but 
rather is meant to generate a market for climate information. 
The carbon tax or cap-and-trade liabilities under this proposal 
would therefore be in addition to those imposed by any other 
climate policies. Of course, if anomalous climate outcomes that 
are part of the index became frequent enough, the carbon tax 
would be pushed higher and become very expensive and 
perhaps serve as a regulatory tool after all. If that turns out to 
be the case, the costs of compliance would be the least of our 
worries. 
A carbon tax in the neighborhood of Nordhaus’s $7.50 
estimate of the marginal social damages seems to be a good 
starting point. A wide range of economists would agree that the 
marginal social damages are at least that and would endorse 
such a tax level.149
3. Which Climate Outcomes? 
 The indexed carbon tax level should be 
adjusted for inflation to ensure that prices for tradable permits 
keep pace with market prices for other goods, thereby keeping 
constant the budgetary effects of the indexed carbon tax on 
emitters. Finally, to smooth out some of the potential volatility 
in this carbon tax, it could be indexed not just to the basket of 
outcomes from the previous year but to a moving average of the 
climate outcomes over a period of time. While the moving 
average period may not, and need not, capture very long-term 
climatic cycles, even an average of the previous five or ten 
years can smooth out some of the year-to-year variations in 
weather by diluting the effects of one or more exceptional 
years. 
In addition to these two basic carbon tax questions, this 
proposal requires resolution of a third, more complicated 
matter: construction of the index to which the carbon tax level 
is linked. Toward this end, the basket of climate outcomes that 
make up the index should be composed of outcomes that (1) are 
 
CHEAP ENERGY, ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY AND NATIONAL PROSPERITY 7 (2010), 
available at http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/Post-Partisan%20Power.pdf. 
 149. Nicole Heller & Douglas Fischer, What’s the Economic Impact of Climate 
Change? Pick a Number, CLIMATE CENT. (Jan. 27, 2011), 
http://www.climatecentral.org/blogs/whats-the-economic-impact-of-climate-
change-pick-a-number (showing that the vast majority of studies indicate a 
marginal cost much larger than $7.50 per ton). 
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non-manipulable and (2) are or can be reliably, regularly, and 
uncontroversially counted or measured. Prediction markets can 
only function if the outcomes are clearly defined and the rules 
for adjudication are stable.150
As an example of how climate outcomes should be first-
order climatological effects and not indirect, second-order 
ecological effects, one might consider the inclusion of forest 
fires as a climate outcome. Counting forest fires that become 
more frequent or more damaging due to warmer and drier 
weather,
 But beyond these basic reliability 
criteria, the question of which climate outcomes should be part 
of the index also forces us to confront the question of what 
exactly we wish the index to achieve. First, to keep the index 
focused on climate science, the climate outcomes included in 
the index should truly be climatological effects and not indirect, 
second-order ecological events caused by climate changes. 
Second, the index should capture a broad array of climate 
conditions while balancing the impacts that different outcomes 
will have on the index. That is, the index should provide a 
measure of all of the ways that climate change will affect 
humankind but without over-emphasizing any particular way 
that climate change will affect humankind. 
151 or counting the forestry industry losses from heat-
stressed dieback,152 may seem more relevant and more directly 
connected to human loss. Not only that, but a solid body of 
research seems to support the notion that a climate-changed 
future will lead to these ecological outcomes.153 But focusing on 
outcomes that are more closely linked to the increase in 
greenhouse gases would ensure that the index is a gauge of the 
real, unavoidable threats posed by climate change. If the index 
could be changed by, for example, a widespread change in fire 
suppression practices, then it would not be an index of climate 
change but an index of climate change and how humans 
respond to it. Similarly, while forest fires and the pine-beetle 
outbreaks can be reasonably tied to climate change, so can 
monoculture-dominated forestry practices.154
 
 150. Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 
 Including second-
82, at 120. 
 151. Anthony L. Westerling, Wildfires, in CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE AND 
POLICY 92, 93–94 (Stephen H. Schneider et al. eds., 2010). 
 152. Phillips et al., supra note 111, at 1346. 
 153. See supra notes 151–52. 
 154. C.S. Holling & Gary K. Meffe, Command and Control and the Pathology of 
Natural Resource Management, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 328 (1996); John 
Nowak et al., The Southern Pine Beetle Prevention Initiative: Working for 
Healthier Forests, 106 J. FORESTRY 261, 262–63 (2008). 
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order outcomes would make for a noisier prediction market in 
which human interventions could interfere with the market 
signals on the quality and importance of climate science. 
Second, some attention should be paid to the relationship 
among the different climate outcomes that make up the index. 
Where climate outcomes are not orthogonal to each other—i.e., 
where they are statistically or climatically related—some 
accounting should be employed so that different aspects of the 
same climate phenomenon are not double-counted or over-
weighted. For example, extreme droughts and extreme rainfall 
events are both part of the same climate phenomenon (the 
intensification of the hydrologic cycle)155
Based on these criteria and taking these factors into 
consideration, the carbon tax should be indexed to the following 
six types of climate outcomes. A precise weighting of the six 
climate outcomes is left to future development. Some 
supplementary discussion of these outcomes is set out in the 
Appendix. 
 and are thus not 
orthogonal. Including both extreme rainfalls and extreme 
droughts in the index is useful because the two types of events 
may not occur in lockstep and will likely occur in different 
parts of the world, but some under-weighting is appropriate. 
And to some extent, some non-orthogonality will be 
unavoidable—given the limits of climate science, we may not 
even know if outcomes are orthogonal or not. But some 
attention to the relatedness of different climate outcomes is 
warranted. 
1. Global mean temperature. The core part of Professor 
McKitrick’s proposal156
The most general and reliable temperature statistic is the 
global mean temperature, which is the temperature averaged 
over an entire year and over the entire planet. This is not 
 is surely on the mark: If one were to 
pick just one proxy for the severity of climate change, 
temperature would almost certainly be the best one. In the 
simplest physical terms, trapping heat within the Earth’s 
atmosphere means that more energy is staying within the 
Earth’s system, which means that the temperature will rise. 
Trapped heat will have other effects, so that temperature alone 
would not form a complete index, but it is surely a fundamental 
indicator of climate change. 
 
 155. See Thomas G. Huntington, Evidence for Intensification of the Global 
Water Cycle: Review and Synthesis, 319 J. HYDROLOGY 83, 83 (2006). 
 156. McKitrick, supra note 101, at 118. 
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necessarily a straightforward measurement; weather 
monitoring in some places in the world is spotty, and because 
weather stations are irregularly spaced throughout the world, 
some statistical manipulation is necessary to reconstruct the 
temperature that evenly represents the whole planet. This has 
been the source of considerable controversy but, as discussed in 
the Appendix, should not interfere with the construction of this 
element of the index. 
It should be noted that because temperature is such a good 
proxy for climate change, it is clearly not orthogonal to other 
climate outcomes. But this is not a reason to exclude 
temperature. Some climate outcomes, such as harm to 
ecosystems and loss of biological diversity, would be difficult to 
quantify and include in an index. It would thus be appropriate 
to weight temperature readings to try to reflect these 
unquantifiable harms that are orthogonal to other climate 
outcomes. 
2. Days of unusually high or low temperatures. While 
global mean temperature is a vital statistic, using just one 
temperature is incomplete in several ways. First, it fails to 
capture the full range of climate effects that are regionally 
unique. Temperature changes in a climate-changed world will 
be heterogeneous. Polar regions will probably experience the 
most dramatic climatic changes,157
Second, climate change is not limited to warming and may 
impose as much harm from unusually low temperatures as it 
does from high temperatures.
 so that a single 
temperature reading will not quite reflect the degree of change 
in the polar regions. 
158 Relying only on one 
temperature allows these two types of opposite extremes to 
cancel each other out, concealing the extreme events that are 
the most serious source of climate harm. High temperature 
extremes are associated with many costly climate effects, such 
as forest fires,159
 
 157. See, e.g., IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT, supra note 
 heat waves that lead to deaths in vulnerable 
26, at 766–67 figs.10.8 & 
10.9. 
 158. For example, current climate conditions sustain an Atlantic Ocean 
circulatory pattern that keeps Europe warm by bringing warm air northward 
from the tropics. One potential effect of climate change would be the shutdown of 
this circulatory pattern—the Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation—which would 
make Europe so cold as to be uninhabitable. See, e.g., HENSON, supra note 48, at 
119–22. 
 159. See Westerling, supra note 151, at 93–94. 
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human populations,160 and a variety of ecological effects that 
impose indirect but potentially large costs upon society.161 
Unusually low temperature extremes, widely considered to be a 
part of climate change,162 also impose costs on cities, 
agricultural industries, and other staples of society that are ill-
prepared to deal with cold-weather events such as record frosts 
and snowfalls.163
The index should include a broad basket of temperature 
readings from weather stations throughout the world to 
capture all of the different regional changes. And to make this 
data meaningful, the raw temperature readings should be 
transformed into counts of days with extreme temperatures. For 
each reporting weather station made a part of the index, an 
annual (or periodic moving average) count should be made of 
days in which unusually high and unusually low temperatures 
are reached. This definition of this climate outcome 
operationalizes regional variations in climate change, cold as 
well as hot anomalies, and the truly harmful events—extreme 
temperature (hot and cold) situations. Further details on 
quantifying this climate outcome are provided in the Appendix. 
 Some statistical transformation needs to be 
made of the raw temperature data. 
 
 160. It was estimated that the summer heat wave that struck Moscow in 2010 
nearly doubled the number of daily deaths. Death Rate Doubles in Moscow as 
Heat Wave Continues, BBC NEWS (Aug. 9, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 
world-europe-10912658. The heat wave has been estimated to have caused 7,000 
deaths in Moscow alone and 15,000 in Russia overall and to have decreased 
Russia’s GDP by fifteen billion dollars. Lucian Kim & Maria Levitov, Russia Heat 
Wave May Kill 15,000, Shave $15 Billion of GDP, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 10, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-10/russia-may-lose-15-000-lives-15-
billion-of-economic-output-in-heat-wave.html. 
 161. For example, damages to wetlands could undermine some of the 
ecosystem services that are provided, such as water filtration, flood control, and 
feeding grounds for migratory waterfowl. Climate change could affect water 
systems that are major water sources for population centers. And finally, loss of 
biological diversity worldwide could deprive humankind in a wide variety of ways, 
such as depriving it of medicinal resources, disrupting predator-prey relationships 
so that pests become more prevalent, or allowing some pests to become disease 
vectors. See, e.g., Rik Leemans, Ecosystems, in CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE AND 
POLICY, supra note 1, at 56, 57–61. 
 162. HENSON, supra note 48, at 55–56; Wayne Higgins et al., The Facts About 
Snowstorms & Climate Change, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
http://www.noaa.gov/features/02_monitoring/snowstorms.html (last visited Feb. 
25, 2011). 
 163. An unusual number of snowstorms affecting New York City imposed 
substantial costs, including loss of revenue from parking meters buried under 
snow. Manny Fernandez, Crime Down, Bills Up: How Snow Affects the City, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2011, at A23. 
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3. Extreme rainfall and drought events. One of the ironies 
of climate change is that it will make water both more 
abundant and more scarce. In neither case, however, will this 
be helpful. Climate change will intensify the hydrological cycle, 
leading to both increased instances of flooding and drought, 
and probably, in different places, making water supply 
management much more difficult (if not impossible).164
Costs from extreme rainfall events and drought in the 
United States could be as much as 0.5% of GDP,
 Again, 
if one were to simply take a total rainfall number as a climate 
outcome, the aggregated number would conceal the extremes 
that are most harmful. Part of the index should thus capture 
the occurrence of precipitation extremes, just as it captures 
temperature extremes. 
165 or about 
seventy billion dollars.166
4. Rises in sea level. If there is one climate outcome that 
has alarmed people, it is the prospect of rising sea levels that 
jeopardize trillions of dollars of real estate worldwide.
 Of the two, extreme drought seems 
less manageable, as life without water is impossible. Adapting 
to extreme rainfall, however, would only be more manageable if 
vital infrastructures to capture and store water were 
dramatically upgraded or fundamentally altered, measures 
that are probably out of the reach of most developing countries. 
The different nature of the harms of extreme rainfall and 
drought seems to warrant separate measurement in the index. 
Again, details on how to define and count extreme rainfall 
events and droughts are set forth in the Appendix. 
167 In 
reality, the most expensive real estate is in developed 
countries, which have the resources and the engineering skills 
to construct sea walls to protect certain cities.168
 
 164. See, e.g., HENSON, supra note 
 While climate 
change may tax the capacity of dikes in the Netherlands, some 
of which have been designed to withstand 10,000 years’ worth 
48, at 58; Peter H. Gleick, Water, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE AND POLICY, supra note 1, at 74, 75–76. 
 165. Gleick, supra note 164, at 78. 
 166. The estimated 2009 GDP of the United States is slightly over fourteen 
trillion dollars. The World Factbook: United States, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last visited July 8, 2011). 
 167. See TIM LENTON ET AL., MAJOR TIPPING POINTS IN THE EARTH’S CLIMATE 
SYSTEM AND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE INSURANCE SECTOR 37 (2009), available at 
https://www.allianz.com/static-resources/en/press/media/documents/tipping_points 
.pdf (estimating a loss of one trillion dollars for New York City alone). 
 168. Id. at 34. 
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of storms,169 some engineering solutions do seem imaginable, if 
unattractive and possibly uneconomical.170 Perhaps most 
ominously, rising sea levels could lead to civil unrest, as some 
of the most vulnerable populations in low-lying areas such as 
the Ganges Delta in Eastern India and Bangladesh171 would 
find permanent migration necessary. Low-lying island 
countries, such as the Maldives and Tuvalu, could find it 
necessary to find entirely new homes for their permanently 
displaced populace, imposing an entirely new set of economic 
and diplomatic challenges.172
Moreover, for larger sea level rises, even some advanced 
countries will face enormous costs. With a rise of six meters in 
mean sea level, much of what is presently Florida would be 
uninhabitable.
 
173 As there is still a fair amount of 
disagreement among climate scientists about the range of 
possible sea level rises attributable to climate change, larger 
values cannot be ruled out. Climate scientist James Hansen 
even believes that, with a 3° C increase in mean global 
temperatures, enough glacial melting at the poles could occur 
to bring on a catastrophic twenty-five-meter increase in mean 
sea levels,174 orders of magnitude greater than the IPCC’s 
estimate of 0.22 to 0.44 meters.175 Few climate scientists share 
Hansen’s level of alarm,176
5. Ocean acidity. As CO2 concentrations increase in the 
atmosphere, oceans absorb much of the CO2, taking up an 
estimated 500 gigatons of CO2, about thirty percent of fossil 
fuel emissions since 1800.
 but neither is it dismissed. Apart 
from the potential for harm from sea level rises, it is this kind 
of scientific uncertainty that might be best run through a 
prediction market. 
177
 
 169. See Krystian W. Pilarczyk, Design Philosophy and Methodology, in DIKES 
AND REVETMENTS: DESIGN, MAINTENANCE AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT 11, 15 
(Krystian W. Pilarczyk ed., 1998). 
 This absorption has come at a cost 
of increasing the acidity of the ocean, thereby decreasing the 
 170. Id. 
 171. HENSON, supra note 48, at 115. 
 172. Id. at 112–13. 
 173. Id. at 114. 
 174. See J.E. Hansen, Scientific Reticence and Sea Level Rise, 2 ENVTL. RES. 
LETTERS 024002, at 3 (2007). 
 175. IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT, supra note 26, at 409 fig.1. 
 176. HENSON, supra note 48, at 118. 
 177. Carol Turley, Marine Ecosystems, in CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE AND 
POLICY 66, 68 (Stephen H. Schneider et al. eds., 2010). 
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mean pH of the world’s oceans by 0.1.178 This is a subtle but 
potentially much more costly and harmful effect than a rise in 
sea level, as the disruption of marine ecosystems could lead to 
a crash in marine food chains179 that sustain an enormous 
fraction of the world’s population and currently contribute 
almost $250 billion per year to the world economy.180 Coral 
reefs, in particular, are believed to be vulnerable to even small 
changes in acidity and are believed to play an important role in 
maintaining biological diversity in oceans.181
6. Hurricanes above a certain intensity level. Hurricanes 
are hypothesized to increase in severity with increases in sea 
surface temperature, and increases in sea surface temperature 
are believed to be a consequence of the trapping of heat by 
greenhouse gases.
 If a severe decline 
in ocean life and a serious disruption to the marine food chain 
occurs, the damages would well exceed $250 billion, since the 
value of something like food is far greater than what the 
market price would suggest, especially when it becomes scarce. 
While it is difficult to ascertain how harmful changes in acidity 
will be to humankind, this is clearly an important climate 
effect to include in an index. 
182 But there is no current scientific 
consensus on a link between hurricanes and climate change.183 
There is, however, a great deal of attention and research, 
especially following the publication in 2005 of two articles, one 
by M.I.T. atmospheric scientist Kerry Emanuel,184
 
 178. HENSON, supra note 
 and one by a 
48, at 124. 
 179. See, e.g., THE ROYAL SOC’Y, OCEAN ACIDIFICATION DUE TO INCREASING 
ATMOSPHERIC CARBON DIOXIDE 15 (2005), available at http://royalsociety.org/ 
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=5709; Christopher L. Sabine et al., The 
Oceanic Sink for Anthropogenic CO2, 305 SCIENCE 367 (2004). 
 180. Andrew J. Dyck & U. Rashid Sumaila, Economic Impact of Ocean Fish 
Populations in the Global Fishery, 12 J. BIOECONOMICS 227, 227 (2010). 
 181. See HENSON, supra note 48, at 125–26. 
 182. See, e.g., J.A. Curry et al., Mixing Politics and Science in Testing the 
Hypothesis That Greenhouse Warming Is Causing a Global Increase in Hurricane 
Intensity, 87 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 1025, 1032 (2006); Kerry 
Emanuel, Increasing Destructiveness of Tropical Cyclones over the Past 30 Years, 
436 NATURE 686, 686–88 (2005); Thomas R. Knutson, Has Global Warming 
Affected Atlantic Hurricane Activity?, GEOPHYSICAL FLUID DYNAMICS 
LABORATORY (Sept. 3, 2008), http://www.gfdl.noaa.gov/global-warming-and-
hurricanes. 
 183. See Curry et al., supra note 182, at 1032. A significant problem is that the 
worldwide record of storms is not very long, dating back only to 1851 for North 
American storms, id., and 1949 for global storms, Hurricane/Tropical Data, supra 
note 114. 
 184. Emanuel, supra note 182. 
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team at Georgia Tech,185 which coincided with Hurricane 
Katrina (which has not been attributed to climate change). 
Current thinking among most climate scientists studying the 
effects of climate change on hurricanes is that climate change 
may produce more intense hurricanes, but not necessarily more 
of them.186
As discussed above, “deadliness” and “costliness” are not 
the correct ways to think about inherent climate harm. The 
existence of potential avoidance and mitigation actions, ex ante 
and ex post, means that these measures could be internally 
inconsistent, varying from one hurricane to the next depending 
on the (climatically) irrelevant factor of where the hurricanes 
made landfall.
 An index of climate outcomes may thus include a 
count of more severe hurricanes, not a raw count of all 
hurricanes. 
187
Constructing an index for a carbon tax thus turns out to be 
a fairly tricky exercise. It raises not only some mundane but 
also some unexpectedly philosophical questions about climate 
change that challenge what we fear, know, and wish to know 
about climate change. A number of other possible climate 
outcomes could be defensibly included in an index.
 Nevertheless, if there is a link between 
hurricanes and climate change, it is one of the few climate 
outcomes that would be orthogonal to global mean temperature 
and would capture a climate harm not captured by other 
outcomes. 
188
 
 185. P.J. Webster et al., Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration, and 
Intensity in a Warming Environment, 309 SCIENCE 1844 (2005). 
 Over 
time, it may become apparent that other climate outcomes 
should have been included at the outset. Answering these 
questions and constructing the index with precision, however, 
 186. See, e.g., Curry et al., supra note 182; Emanuel, supra note 182. 
 187. See Jerry D. Jarrell et al., The Deadliest, Costliest, and Most Intense 
United States Hurricanes from 1900 to 2000, ATLANTIC OCEANOGRAPHIC & 
METEOROLOGICAL LABORATORY, http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/Landsea/deadly 
(last updated Oct. 2001). 
 188. For example, another potential climate outcome could be Arctic Ocean sea 
ice extent. Melting Arctic sea ice has long been thought to be one of the most 
alarming consequences of climate change, as it portends a palpably dramatic 
change in the Arctic environment. See HENSON, supra note 48, at 75. The 
National Snow and Ice Data Center in Boulder, Colorado, is of the opinion that 
“[l]ong-term changes in Arctic sea ice are an index of climate change.” Sea Ice 
Index, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA CENTER, http://nsidc.org/data/seaice_index (last 
visited June 13, 2011). However, it is not clear that sea ice extent would be a 
better indicator than a count of the number of days of unusually high 
temperatures for an Arctic weather station, which would be part of climate 
outcome number two. 
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is not as important as the overall goal of the proposal—to run 
climate science through a market filter and neutralize the 
political partisanship and disingenuous posturing that has 
tainted the debate. However, because the problem of climate 
change is so important, and the stakes so large, it is worth 
spending some time to get the details of the indexed carbon tax 
right. 
B. The Cap-and-Trade Program 
The establishment of a cap-and-trade program to act as 
essentially a prediction market for future climate outcomes 
gives rise to the other set of tricky implementation questions. 
As a cap-and-trade program, it raises the usual 
implementation questions, plus those that are unique to this 
program’s situation in a carbon tax environment. One of the 
usual implementation questions is that of which entities should 
be covered (required to hold permits for their emissions). Under 
most cap-and-trade programs, being covered is a burden; in 
this program, the cap-and-trade system is for permits that 
represent an exemption to the indexed carbon tax, and are thus 
an opportunity to lower the regulatory costs, rather than just 
minimize them through trading. As the indexed carbon tax is 
proposed to apply upstream to all coal mines, natural gas 
processors, oil refineries, and fossil fuel importers,189
1. Initial Allocation of Permits 
 these are 
the entities that must be allowed to hold permits in lieu of 
paying the carbon tax. Of course, other entities and other 
people are allowed to buy and sell permits; this proposal 
depends vitally on widespread market participation as a means 
of aggregating the widely disparate pieces of information about 
climate science. The program-scoping question thus resolved by 
virtue of its link to the carbon tax, this Article now turns to the 
remaining issues involved in setting up the cap-and-trade 
program: the initial allocation of permits and the timing and 
quantity of permits to be issued. 
The first and most obvious implementation question for 
setting up a cap-and-trade program is how to make the initial 
allocation of permits. Should they be auctioned or given away 
 
 189. See supra notes 129–35 and accompanying text. 
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for free? If given away for free, should they be “grandfathered” 
in on the basis of historical emissions, or on the basis of some 
other politically-devised method of allocation? As an economic 
matter and a distributional matter, auctioning permits is 
almost always superior to giving them away for free. Not only 
does the latter effect a transfer from taxpayers to wealthy 
individuals (shareholders of emitting firms), but it also 
produces some economically distortionary effects.190 As a 
political matter, however, giving away permits to purchase 
political support, under the guise of “transition relief,” is 
usually viewed as being necessary in order to obtain even a 
remote chance of legislative passage in the United States.191 It 
is apparently lost on no one that when a cap-and-trade 
program gives away permits, the legislature is essentially 
printing money, albeit an undetermined amount.192
The cap-and-trade part of this proposal differs from an 
ordinary cap-and-trade program in two respects that might 
render the free allocation of permits a little less irresistible and 
auctioning a little more politically palatable. First, the carbon 
tax is to be initially set at a low level so that the permit prices 
will be low and their value as transition relief concomitantly 
low. Second, permit prices in this program will not be driven by 
scarcity, as they are in pure cap-and-trade programs, but 
rather by expectations of future climate outcomes. The trading 
market for permits to emit in the distant future could be very 
thin. Those emitters given free permits may conclude that the 
simplest option in the near term is to wait and see what 
happens in the near- and medium-run. If that turns out to be a 
common strategy, then the value of those free permits may be 
quite low. With low prices, it would also make the economic 
pain of buying permits less acute. A thin trading market would 
also mean that the market would be missing an important 
opportunity to collect a valuable piece of information: the 
auction price. For these reasons, the permits to emit in future 
years in this proposal should be auctioned rather than given 
away for free. 
 
 
 190. See, e.g., HSU, supra note 105, at 61–62; Dallas Burtraw et al., The 
Incidence of U.S. Climate Policy: Alternative Uses of Revenues from a Cap-and-
Trade Auction 2 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 09-17-REV, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1392251. 
 191. See HSU, supra note 105, at 120–21; Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan 
Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
391, 393 (2010). 
 192. HSU, supra note 105, at 62. 
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2. How Far in Advance Should Permits Be 
Available? 
As the point of a cap-and-trade program is to process 
information about future climate conditions, it is important to 
decide how far in advance permits should be available. Of 
course, if permits were not tradable, then asking firms to bid 
on permits many years in advance might ask too much in terms 
of information. But it is the trading activity subsequent to 
initial acquisition through auction that will yield the most 
important information. Obviously, as the vintage year of a 
permit approaches, one should expect the price of the permit to 
be a better estimate of the actual prices and a better 
anticipation of climate outcomes. Just as obviously, in 
evaluating the market signals produced by this program, some 
consideration must be made of the time value of money. If a 
firm is buying a permit to avoid a carbon tax thirty or forty 
years in the future, then it can be expected to discount that 
future carbon tax liability substantially, paying much less for 
permits to emit far in the future than it would for permits to 
emit in the next year or two. 
As a starting point, the failed American Clean Energy and 
Security Act of 2009193 (a.k.a. Waxman-Markey, after the co-
sponsors) and the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power 
Act194 (a.k.a. Kerry-Lieberman, after the co-sponsors) 
contemplated a cap-and-trade system out to 2050. Also, 
California’s AB 32, its landmark climate change legislation, 
includes a cap-and-trade program that contemplates a 
reduction of greenhouse emissions by eighty percent by the 
year 2050.195
There is the objection that such a long time horizon seems 
Pollyannaish since emitters may not believe that this proposal, 
if enacted, would stay intact for forty years. If that were the 
case, then there would be very little interest in bidding for 
permits more than a few years down the road. Waxman-
Markey and Kerry-Lieberman, one might snort, could afford to 
 An auction of permits forty years in advance 
would thus prima facie seem reasonable. 
 
 193. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 321 (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/ 
data/us/bills.text/111/h/h2454pcs.pdf. 
 194. S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 111 (2010), available at http://www.govtrack.us/ 
data/us/bills.text/111/s/s1733rs.pdf. 
 195. Cap-and-Trade, AIR RESOURCES BOARD, CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm (last visited July 
8, 2011). 
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be unrealistically optimistic because, even if one believed that 
targets in 2050 would remain intact, many near- and medium-
term greenhouse gas emission reductions would take place, and 
those reductions were the most important objective of climate 
legislation anyway. 
The response to this objection is that participation in a 
program like this would create its own policy stability: those 
who spend money on buying auctioned permits would oppose 
an abandonment of a program such as this, as that would leave 
them with valueless permits. This would especially be true if 
some emitters felt that they had been clever enough to have 
obtained future permits at a low price and thus stand to lose 
out if the program is stopped. Unlike most cap-and-trade 
programs, this proposal explicitly contemplates making 
emitters think far in advance and plan for the fairly distant 
future. Once investments are made in reliance on this program, 
dismantling it would become politically and perhaps 
economically costly. So a cap-and-trade program could be 
designed with a little bit of optimism about the prospects for its 
survival and credibility. And since the purpose of a cap-and-
trade program is to generate and evaluate information about 
climate conditions with long time horizons, this program would 
not be useful unless it sold permits for vintage years far in the 
future. Looking ahead forty years, as did the Waxman-Markey 
and Kerry-Lieberman bills, does not seem overly optimistic. 
3. How Many Permits Should Be Available for a 
Vintage Year? 
It is worth being careful about how many permits to make 
available for each vintage year. A target amount of permits 
would have to be large enough to create a real market, one that 
is large enough to mobilize interest in evaluating climate 
science. The number of available permits should be large 
enough to ensure a robust market that reveals significant 
information about opinions of climate science. But the number 
of available permits should also not be too large. A surfeit of 
permits could drive the market price below the indexed carbon 
tax, which would create the risk that this hybrid program 
would simply morph into a pure cap-and-trade program. This 
program would lose the benefit of having the cap-and-trade 
program actually reveal information about opinions of climate 
science. 
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This over-allocation danger should also be borne in mind 
when considering the possibility of another, more ambitious 
climate policy with an explicit goal of reducing greenhouse 
gases (unlike this proposal, which is primarily aimed at 
generating information about climate science). If at any time, 
for any reason, emissions fall below the number of extant 
permits available, the price of permits will be driven to near 
zero. For example, if a more ambitious policy drives emissions 
lower than the number of extant permits under this tax-and-
cap-and-trade program, then there will be more permits 
available than are needed to permit emissions. There would be 
no scarcity of permits at all, and no prices to generate 
information about climate science, stripping this proposal of 
any informational benefits. So determining the extant number 
of permits to make available involves a moving target, taking 
into account the possibility of future policy advances that might 
curtail future emissions. 
A little back-of-the-envelope math would help the reader 
gain a rough idea of how many permits should be available for 
each year. Consider that world emissions of CO2 were 
approximately 30.55 gigatons in 2007, 5.97 of which were 
emitted by the United States.196
Is this enough of a market to meet the program’s goals of 
generating interest among emitters in participating? 
Assuming, just for the purpose of a rough calculation, a trading 
price of $5 per permit—that the best forecasts for the indexed 
carbon tax would be about $5 per ton—the cap-and-trade 
program would create a $2 billion market, $50 million of which 
 Even if, assuming 
optimistically, some legislation such as Waxman-Markey comes 
back to pass in a future Congress and that an eighty percent 
reduction is achieved, that would still mean that roughly 1.2 
gigatons of CO2 would be emitted in the United States in 2050. 
If the cap-and-trade program issued, say, one-third of that 
emissions total, 400 million permits of vintage year 2050 
should be made available. In the interests of maintaining some 
consistency in terms of the amount of climate information 
generated for each future year, the number of permits available 
each vintage year should be uniform, necessitating some 
scheduling of permit auctions. A proposed schedule is set forth 
in the Appendix. 
 
 196. WORLD RES. INST., CLIMATE ANALYSIS INDICATORS TOOL: TOTAL GHG 
EMISSIONS IN 2007 (2011) (total world emissions are obtained by dividing U.S. 
emissions by its fraction of world emissions). 
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is added each year. As noted earlier, AEP’s 2005 emissions 
would have produced a carbon tax liability of about $805 
million,197 assuming that it does not reduce emissions. The 
liability of the top 101 emitters would be about $8.75 billion.198
Cap-and-trade programs invariably require resolution of a 
number of design issues. This Article proposes the simplest 
resolutions of two fundamental cap-and-trade design issues: 
how permits are allocated (by auction) and who is covered 
(everyone, upstream). In addition, this Article suggests some 
parameters for some of the design issues that are specific to 
this proposal, ones that will determine how useful this program 
is to aggregating and processing climate science. 
 
It could be much higher if dangerous climate outcomes become 
unexpectedly frequent. That would appear to be enough to 
mobilize interest in forecasting climate outcomes and the 
resulting indexed carbon tax. 
C. Competitiveness and Trade Concerns 
This proposal could be the subject of national, state, or 
provincial legislation, or of a regional program among states 
and provinces, or indeed a program among almost any 
combination of jurisdictions. But whatever its constituents, an 
important consideration in adopting this proposal is what, if 
anything, to do about the competitiveness of firms, vis-à-vis 
those outside of the jurisdiction that do not face the costs of a 
carbon pricing program such as this one. This Section 
addresses this problem, working from an assumption that the 
program is a national one. 
The climate change problem is unique in the overwhelming 
incentive it produces to free-ride. The harder one country tries 
to reduce its CO2 emissions by reducing fossil fuel use, the 
greater downward pressure on fossil fuel prices (due to the 
resulting decrease in demand), the greater the temptation for 
other countries, especially developing ones, to snap up the 
suddenly abundant and cheap fossil fuel.199
 
 197. Clean Energy, supra note 
 And finally, this 
proposal would appear to even further exacerbate that cruel 
dynamic: A carbon tax indexed to climate outcomes could very 
116. 
 198. See supra text accompanying note 126. 
 199. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, A Game-Theoretic Model of International Climate 
Change Negotiations, 29 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573054. 
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well increase in part because of the emissions of other, non-
cooperating countries, since CO2 emissions anywhere 
contribute to climate changes everywhere. American industries 
subjected to this tax-and-cap-and-trade program could wind up 
paying more carbon taxes because China is uncooperative and 
emitting greater amounts of CO2. 
There are two responses built into the structure of this 
proposal: (1) the revenues from both the carbon tax and the 
auction proceeds from the cap-and-trade part can be used for 
transition relief, and (2) this tax-and-cap-and-trade program, if 
implemented, may provide a legitimate basis for levying a 
border tax adjustment on imports from countries that do not 
price carbon.200
First and foremost, this tax-and-cap-and-trade proposal, 
like other proposals, creates a source of revenue. As suggested 
earlier, some of these revenues can be targeted at communities 
that suffer damages from climate events or used to fund 
adaptation measures. But another potential use for the 
revenues is to provide some relief for industries that face 
competitive pressures from firms in countries that do not price 
carbon. What little evidence that is able to rise above the hand-
wringing suggests that the amount of “offshoring” of both 
manufacturing and emissions is relatively small and possibly 
exaggerated to serve protectionist purposes.
 
201
 
 200. This latter consideration does not apply if the proposal is carried out as a 
state, provincial, or regional program. 
 Nevertheless, to 
the extent that this policy could provide some palliative for 
industries feeling a bit vulnerable, it is an advantage that 
many other climate policies do not have. Granted, while 
transition relief provided from the proceeds of this proposal 
could not make emitters whole, it could provide some 
incentives and support for carbon-intensive and trade-exposed 
 201. TREVOR HOUSER ET AL., PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., LEVELING THE 
CARBON PLAYING FIELD: INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND US CLIMATE POLICY 
DESIGN 10 (2008), available at http://pdf.wri.org/leveling_the_carbon_ 
playing_field.pdf (showing that a carbon tax of ten dollars per ton would only 
reduce output by 0.5%). Only eighteen percent of the steel, aluminum, cement, 
paper, and basic chemicals produced in the world are internationally traded. Id. 
at 77. Although carbon pricing could increase this amount, it is not widely 
believed among economists to be likely to have much of an effect. Joost Pauwelyn, 
U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and 
Options of International Trade Law 6 (Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions, 
Working Paper No. 07-02, 2007), available at http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/ 
climate/policydesign/u.s.-federal-climate-policy-and-competitiveness-concerns-the-
limits-and-options-of-international-trade-law/at_download/paper. 
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industries to re-examine old assumptions about the need to 
emit greenhouse gases. And the revenues available to 
accomplish this are not trivial; even at a low carbon tax rate of 
$5 per ton, if it covered all fossil fuel emissions in the United 
States, the combined proceeds from the tax and the cap-and-
trade program would total about $30 billion annually at 
present emission rates.202
Second, a carbon tax provides perhaps the best legal 
chance under international trade rules to levy a border tax 
adjustment on imports from countries that do not price carbon. 
World Trade Organization (WTO) panels and predecessor 
panels of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
have had a mixed record when it comes to allowing countries to 
protect domestic industries disadvantaged by stronger 
environmental regulations at home.
 Even a small portion of that could go 
a long way toward transition relief. 
203 While WTO and 
predecessor GATT panels have been stingy in permitting trade 
relief on environmental grounds, based on provisions under the 
“General Exceptions” article (Article XX),204 they have been 
somewhat less skeptical when reviewing border tax 
adjustments under Article II.205 Article II.2(a) of the GATT 
provides that GATT’s prohibitions on tariffs do not prevent a 
country “from imposing at any time on the importation of any 
product . . . a charge equivalent to an internal tax . . . in respect 
of the like domestic product or in respect of an article from 
which the imported product has been manufactured or 
produced in whole or in part.”206
The question is thus whether a carbon tax could be likened 
to other “internal” taxes that would justify a border tax 
adjustment under Article II. The international trade 
jurisprudence, such as it were, is sketchy and incomplete. From 
 “Internal taxes” are commonly 
interpreted as including sales taxes, excise taxes, or value-
added taxes. 
 
 202. U.S. emissions were about six gigatons of CO2 in 2007. WORLD RES. INST., 
supra note 196. 
 203. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Bridging the Trade-Environment Divide, 15 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 113, 114 (2001); George Hoberg, Trade, Harmonization, and 
Domestic Autonomy in Environmental Policy, 3 J. COMP. POL’Y ANALYSIS: RES. & 
PRAC. 191, 195–207 (2001). 
 204. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. 
 205. Pauwelyn, supra note 201, at 17. 
 206. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 204, 61 Stat. at A15, 
55 U.N.T.S. at 202 (emphasis added). 
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the literature that has emerged on this possibility, the 
consensus is a resounding “maybe.”207
At least on an international level, then, this tax-and-cap-
and-trade proposal would thus appear to have some economic 
resources and legal footing on which to address 
competitiveness and trade concerns. Even if such concerns are 
exaggerated, it cannot be an inefficient move to equalize carbon 
pricing burdens across borders, and it could well prove to be 
helpful in recruiting international cooperation on greenhouse 
gas emissions reduction. 
 What does seem clear, 
however, is that a carbon tax is less vulnerable to a WTO 
challenge than many other climate policies in that it seeks to 
equalize a tax burden across trade borders. For cap-and-trade 
programs in which allowances are distributed for free, either 
on the basis of historical emissions or on some other politically-
derived formula, it would be difficult to make the case that a 
border tax adjustment sought to equalize a burden, since 
domestic emitters would already be benefitting from free 
allowances. In this regard, this tax-and-cap-and-trade program, 
insofar as it imposes unambiguous, unitary charges, would be a 
better platform from which to justify a border tax adjustment 
than other policies. 
D. How Well Will the Market Work? 
As noted earlier, recent market travails have cast a 
shadow over markets as allocative mechanisms.208 More so 
than in the past, people distrust market prices as fundamental 
indicators of inherent value.209
 
 207. See, e.g., HOUSER ET AL., supra note 
 In the long run, however, 
markets still provide the best chance of ascertaining value. 
There is still no institution that more rationally evaluates 
value. 
201, at 30; GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER 
ET AL., GLOBAL WARMING AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 39–46 (2009); Gavin 
Goh, The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax Adjustments at the 
Border, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 395, 422–23 (2004); Roland Ismer & Karsten Neuhoff, 
Border Tax Adjustment: A Feasible Way to Support Stringent Emission Trading, 
24 EUR. J. LAW & ECON. 137, 143–52 (2007); Pauwelyn, supra note 201, at 17–23. 
But see DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT—TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE 
FUTURE 168 (1994). 
 208. See supra Part II. 
 209. See supra Part II. 
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One objection is that irrationalities do creep into market 
evaluations, and the outcome can be spectacularly bad.210 
When analysts’ valuations are systemically errant—when they 
are systemically based on other analysts’ errant evaluations—
assumptions of widespread rationality break down, and a long 
chain of inaccurate valuations cascades throughout a market, 
skewing prices. When a critical piece of corrective information 
finally emerges, prices can be crushed almost instantaneously 
in an electronic era. But systemic error can persist for a long 
time before a correction. As Keynes famously remarked, 
“[m]arkets can stay irrational longer than you can stay 
solvent.”211
According to James Surowiecki, the author of the book The 
Wisdom of Crowds, the danger of systemic and cascading 
breakdowns in market accuracy emerges when evaluations lose 
independence from each other.
 
212 The strength of markets and 
the advantage of the many are only present when a diverse 
body of people, thinking independently, make their own 
evaluations. Independence is so important because it ensures 
that groupthink does not form and that ideas are genuinely 
tested before individuals begin to adopt them.213
In this way, a prediction market in future climate 
outcomes—the cap-and-trade program—would make a virtue 
out of the exasperatingly deep divide between climate scientists 
and climate skeptics. Climate skeptics would, in all likelihood, 
make the market for climate information better, even if in the 
end they are proven wrong in their skepticism. It is the 
intellectual challenge posed to ideas that strengthens them. 
This was the way that the concept of the “marketplace of 
ideas”
 
214
 
 210. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 
 was supposed to work. Something seems to have gone 
86, at 41–43. 
 211. Maureen O’Hara, Bubbles: Some Perspective (and Loose Talk) from 
History, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 11, 14 (2008). 
 212. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 86, at 41–43. 
 213. See id. 
 214. This widely used market metaphor to support legal arguments for the 
First Amendment right to freedom of expression is attributed to a dissenting 
opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 
616 (1919), but was never actually used by Justice Holmes. In Keyishian v. Board 
of Regents, another U.S. Supreme Court case, this one involving the 
constitutionality of a university’s requirement that its faculty members certify 
that they were not Communists, Justice Brennan wrote that “[t]he classroom is 
peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon leaders 
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers 
truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of 
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wrong in the marketplace for climate ideas, and a prediction 
market is likely to at least improve the situation. Because 
climate science and climate skepticism are both brutally cross-
examined, a market in climate science would seem to be a poor 
host for systemic errors. 
In addition to suffering systemic error, markets can be 
subject to conscious manipulation. Abramowicz discusses the 
possibility of market manipulation and reviews the literature 
on market manipulations, particularly in prediction 
markets.215 His tentative conclusion is that in markets 
possessing a great deal of public information, the empirical 
evidence does not support a fear of long-term effects from 
manipulation.216
A brief thought experiment in imagining a market for 
climate outcomes would provide some reassurance that a 
prediction market in climate science would be even less 
susceptible to manipulation. The findings and assertions of 
climate science are almost completely public (even if climate 
skeptics charge that climate scientists have been secretive 
about their data). Under the Abramowicz analysis of prediction 
markets, this predominance of public information would pose a 
significant obstacle for market manipulators hoping to bias a 
perception. The task of biasing opinion for a long enough period 
of time to profit would be enormously difficult, as it would be 
facing a barrage of countervailing assertions every day from 
both climate scientists and climate skeptics. While some 
industry groups and ideological groups have succeeded in 
biasing public opinion against concern about climate change,
 If that is the case, then climate science, 
derived mostly from published data and analysis, should be a 
market that is uniquely insulated from manipulation. Would-
be manipulators would be faced with trying to move prices in 
the face of an enormous amount of information, far more 
information than is ever made public with regard to the 
millions of publicly-traded firms whose shares are traded 
throughout the world. 
217
 
authoritative selection.’ ” 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (second alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)). 
 
convincing those with a material interest in accuracy—such as 
AEP, with its potentially billions of dollars of annual carbon 
 215. ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 82, at 28–32. 
 216. Id. 
 217. See, e.g., Boykoff & Boykoff, supra note 20, at 133. 
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tax liability—would be an entirely different matter with a 
continuing trove of research being produced daily. 
Also, the sheer size of just a domestic U.S. market would 
make sustained market manipulation exorbitantly costly. By 
the rough back-of-the-envelope calculations above,218
Perhaps most relevantly, the few emissions permit 
markets that have been implemented thus far have shown no 
signs of either manipulation or cascading breakdowns due to 
systemic bias and error. The sulfur dioxide trading program 
has never drawn suspicions of market manipulation, even 
while attracting a considerable number of speculators that 
were not involved in the electricity generating industry at 
all.
 with a 
market of about two billion dollars for each vintage year, and 
with a huge number of market participants likely to trade in 
emissions permits, it is inconceivable that anybody would find 
it worthwhile to try to sway the market in any meaningful 
fashion. For a cap-and-trade program whose value is indexed to 
a large basket of climate outcomes, one would have to not only 
skew one piece of information but also manipulate information 
about three or four or five climate outcomes. 
219 Nor have other subsequent programs, such as the 
European Union Emissions Trading System or the much 
smaller (and therefore potentially vulnerable) Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, involving only power plants in ten 
northeastern U.S. states.220 Prices have in some cases been 
volatile,221
Finally, a question related to systemic error and 
manipulation is the question of whether there is enough 
information on which to trade. Is there or would there be 
enough climate science on which to trade? On what basis would 
firms buy permits to emit forty years in the future? 
 and a source of consternation for some investors, 
but in no instance has a price movement been sustained for a 
long time or been cause for suspicion. 
In thinking about this problem it is worth bearing in mind 
that not only do markets knit together disparate information 
and create incentives to reveal information, but they also 
 
 218. See supra text accompanying note 197. 
 219. See, e.g., A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR 7 (2000); 
Jacob Kreutzer, Cap and Trade: A Behavioral Analysis of the Sulfur Dioxide 
Emissions Market, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 125, 138 (2006). 
 220. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/home (last 
visited July 8, 2011). 
 221. HSU, supra note 105, at 71. 
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create incentives to generate new information.222 Beyond public 
monies, private firms have already begun to get involved in the 
climate monitoring business.223 The prospect of more climate 
information may seem daunting to those already inundated by 
climate science, but few climate researchers, even as they 
advocate for strong policies to reduce greenhouse gases, would 
deny that huge data gaps remain.224
Again, because of the unprecedented size of this prediction 
market, the demand for new, better, and more predictive 
climate science will become apparent. Future multi-billion-
dollar carbon tax liabilities, even when discounted, will draw in 
even more climate researchers, potentially working in areas in 
which climate science is currently somewhat less developed, or 
areas that funding agencies may have completely overlooked. 
 
It is also worth bearing in mind that publicly traded stocks 
are traded robustly and are based upon long-term projections of 
profitability that may seem unrealistic. Google currently has a 
market capitalization of about $175 billion,225 with revenues of 
only $27 billion and net income available to common 
shareholders of about $8 billion.226
 
 222. See supra notes 
 In such a fast-moving 
industry, what exactly makes people think Google’s 
profitability is so sustainable for five, ten, twenty, or forty 
years as to warrant this size of investment, especially in a 
rapidly changing industry such as information technology? 
How do people even hazard a guess as to what the industry will 
look like two or three decades from now, and whether Google 
will even exist, let alone be as dominant then as it is now? 
Analysts will cite statistics and compare Google’s figures with 
77–81 and accompanying text. 
 223. Lauren Morello, Measuring Greenhouse Gases, a New Business Venture, 
CLIMATEWIRE (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/print/ 
2011/01/12/2 (paid subscription). 
 224. See Quirin Schiermeier, The Real Holes in Climate Science, 463 NATURE 
284, 284 (2010). 
Researchers say it is difficult to talk openly about holes in 
understanding. “Of course there are gaps in our knowledge about 
Earth’s climate system and its components, and yes, nothing has 
been made clear enough to the public,” says Gavin Schmidt, a 
climate modeller at NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies in 
New York.   
Id. 
 225. Google Inc. (GOOG), YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ks?s=GOOG 
(accessed Aug. 10, 2011). 
 226. Id. 
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those of other companies, but in the end, investors believe that 
somehow, this company is sustainable for many years. 
In markets, we cope with uncertainty by somehow taking 
our best guesses. This is what is needed in climate science. The 
lack of a credible institution that forces us to take our best 
guess about future climate conditions, in the face of 
uncertainty, is precisely the problem with climate policy. Are 
the data flaws so great that costly action is premature, as the 
climate skeptics argue, or are the risks so great that much 
more immediate action is warranted, as climate scientists 
generally argue? Doing nothing is the default policy. Doing 
nothing is also the stock market’s equivalent of stashing one’s 
money in his mattress, a myopic strategy that almost every 
investor recognizes as a sure-fire money-loser. 
E. What Kinds of Information Will Be Reflected in 
Trading Activity? 
Although the primary purpose of this proposal is to 
process, evaluate, and generate climate science, the trading 
activity of future permits will also reflect the emergence of 
other important pieces of information. Many kinds of events, 
not just scientific discoveries about climate science, have the 
potential to affect forecasts of the number and frequency of 
dangerous climate outcomes. This Section discusses some of the 
types of events that may affect trading prices. These events 
create unwelcome side effects, mixing the impacts of climate 
science with those of other events, thereby diluting the signal 
for climate science. Ideally, this proposal would filter out both 
developments unrelated to discoveries and evaluations 
unrelated to climate science, but for some of these events it 
may be difficult to separate out the effects of these events.227
This inevitability underscores again the need to keep the 
index simple and to use it to focus on fundamental indicators of 
 
To some extent, dilution of the signal for climate science is 
unavoidable. 
 
 227. There is the possibility that the effects of some events that could affect 
climate outcomes could be captured by a separate contingent prediction market. 
Separate continent markets could allow for trading in shares of outcomes only if a 
specified condition occurred. So, for example, if the election of Sarah Palin as U.S. 
President were likely to lead to a dismantling of this program, then a separate 
contingent prediction market could be established for those outcomes contingent 
upon her election. For a review of contingent prediction markets, see Wolfers & 
Zitzewitz, supra note 82, at 122–24. 
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climate change. But beyond that, maybe it is not such a bad 
thing that this prediction market captures events other than 
just climate science. Again, in the seemingly constant chatter 
of information about all kinds of developments in climate 
science, technology, and policy, what is the layperson to make 
of it all? A prediction market can help. After all, a wide variety 
of things are said about addressing climate change (or not), and 
there is, again, precious little rational evaluation of the 
seriousness of these things, and there is still a lay public 
wondering what to think.228
Viewed in this vein, a prediction market for climate 
outcomes could aid in the more rational discussion of 
technological developments and their potential to reduce 
greenhouse gases. A prediction market could actually act as an 
arbiter of the quality of climate technologies, a role that 
markets have historically played with great effectiveness. 
Because the index is keyed to climate outcomes, this prediction 
market would judge climate technologies ultimately by their 
ability to change the climate. This information is, like credible 
evaluations of climate science, currently scarce. 
 
Climate technologies currently fall into two very broad 
categories: (1) mitigation technologies, which reduce emissions, 
or (2) post-emission geo-engineering strategies to directly 
reduce the risk of climate change, either by physically or 
chemically removing greenhouse gases from the Earth’s 
atmosphere or reducing the heat-generating effects of solar 
radiation.229 Carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology is 
an example of an emissions reduction technology. CCS aims to 
extract the CO2 from fossil fuels (mostly coal) and store it in 
underground caverns or some other geologically appropriate 
space, where it will remain for an effective eternity and avoid 
affecting the Earth’s climate.230
Some in Congress seem to have fallen in love with CCS 
technology, and some have even likened its development to 
 What should we make of this 
technology? Perhaps more pertinent, how much should 
governments spend to subsidize the development of this 
technology? The answers offered to this question have not been 
sensible, except in a nakedly political sense. 
 
 228. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra note 112. 
 230. Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS), WORLD RESOURCES INST., 
http://www.wri.org/project/carbon-capture-sequestration (last visited Feb. 25, 
2011). 
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that of the atomic bomb, necessitating a super-research effort. 
In a 2009 floor speech, U.S. Senator Lamar Alexander said, “we 
should launch another mini-Manhattan Project and reserve a 
Nobel Prize for the scientist who can get rid of the carbon from 
existing coal plants, because coal provides half our energy.”231 
This seems overenthusiastic. The most prominent pilot 
American CCS project, FutureGen,232 has lost its two biggest 
industry backers, AEP and the Southern Company.233 This is a 
shocking development involving the two largest coal users in 
the United States.234 And yet, FutureGen has suffered a never-
ending series of twists and turns, the news alternately holding 
out the promise of rescuing the coal industry and at times 
sounding the death knell of the whole idea.235
A prediction market for climate outcomes would also 
evaluate geo-engineering technologies and perhaps be an even 
better arbiter, since the only thing that geo-engineering 
projects are supposed to do is reduce the concentration of 
greenhouse gases. One technology currently under 
consideration is “air capture” technology, which literally sucks 
CO2 right out of the air for sequestration.
 How seriously do 
we take information about advances and setbacks with respect 
to CCS? Markets may provide a badly needed reality check. 
236 This is 
accomplished by exposing some alkaline chemical compounds 
capable of reacting with ambient CO2 to form new compounds, 
from which the absorbed CO2 can be captured and stored.237
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 237. Id. at 1655. 
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The concentration of CO2 in the air is very low,238 so capturing 
the CO2 directly from the air is an inherently clumsy 
engineering task.239 However, air capture technology can be 
deployed anywhere, so it can be strategically placed near 
geologic formations susceptible of CO2 storage and can utilize 
renewable energy technologies away from the grid.240 Air 
capture technology is more clearly benign and free from side-
effects than other geo-engineering technologies that have been 
proposed.241 Finally, air capture technology can be employed 
unilaterally and is thus a way around the seemingly 
intractable international diplomacy problems that plague 
climate change.242 But it is expensive—even more so than 
CCS.243
This proposal introduces a financial incentive for people to 
critically evaluate these and other truly climate-altering 
technologies. As some people have become discouraged by the 
one-step-forward-two-steps-backward pace of international 
climate negotiations, the ability of geo-engineering technologies 
to allow unilateral action is, going forward, going to remain a 
policy option. Market evaluations of the feasibility of these 
technologies cannot be a bad thing. A market signal may 
provide policymakers information about what markets think 
about the potential of certain technologies to affect climate 
outcomes. It could be that the most significant thing a market 
in future permits can do is yawn while Washington pundits 
and overnight physicists in the U.S. Congress scream, “this is a 
game-changing technology!”
 How excited should we be about this technology? 
244
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In addition to providing information about technologies, a 
prediction market might also provide information about policy 
developments. This is not altogether welcome, as it dilutes the 
signal for climate science, but again, it is unavoidable. The 
political rise of climate skeptics may dampen prices because of 
the prospect of their dismantling this program if one of them 
becomes President. One response to this has already been 
made: that this program will generate vested interests that 
could make its termination politically costly.245
To again put this inevitability in a more positive light, a 
prediction market might be helpful in interpreting policy 
events. Markets may signal their beliefs in the significance of 
certain actions or statements. For example, the widely 
criticized behavior of Chinese representatives at the 
Copenhagen meeting, seeming to signal a disinterest in 
agreeing to climate action,
 Another 
response is that if a climate skeptic is elected President and 
this program is terminated, then we are no worse off than we 
would be never having had this program and perhaps better off 
for the information collected while the program was in place. 
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 might be a signal that China is 
 245. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 246. During negotiations at the Copenhagen Conference of Parties, Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao twice snubbed world leaders by sending an aide instead of 
attending in person, prompting President Obama to ask, “Mr. Premier, are you 
ready to see me?” Peter Maer, Impromptu Moments Shaped Copenhagen Accord, 
CBSNEWS.COM (Dec. 24, 2009, 12:02 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/ 
12/20/politics/main6000506.shtml. 
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prepared to live in a future world with climate change. On the 
other hand, China has raced past all other countries (including 
the United States) in investment in renewable energy 
technologies, possibly signaling its preparation for a low-carbon 
future.247
F. The Politics of Carbon Taxes and Cap-and-Trade 
 Which way is China heading? It is not a crazy 
thought to entertain that a prediction market might make 
more objective guesses and better projections than climate 
pundits and China-watchers. 
Carbon taxes will continue to be controversial. My other 
work on carbon taxes acknowledges these political realities.248 
At the same time, there is a set of countervailing realities that 
American politicians will have to confront eventually. First, 
rising deficits and the now ever-present concern over sovereign 
debt problems may push carbon taxes out of the taboo category 
and into the “necessary evil” category, as jurisdictions look for 
ways to bridge their yawning budget gaps.249 Second, if other 
nations begin to cobble together some sort of climate policy (as 
Europeans will continue to do) and foster a low-carbon economy 
(as China’s investments in renewable energy seem to be aimed 
at doing), then Americans, Canadians, and other laggards may 
find themselves at political and economic disadvantages. 
Finally, a carbon tax can be made to start out (with present 
climate outcomes) at a low level. A low-enough-indexed carbon 
tax could conceivably fly under the threshold of indignation 
that could doom most climate policies. A $5-per-ton tax, for 
example, translates to a five-cent increase in the price of a 
gallon of gasoline.250
 
 247. Lisa Friedman, China Leads Major Countries with $34.6 Billion Invested 
in Clean Technology, CLIMATEWIRE (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/ 
climatewire/print/2010/03/25/1 (paid subscription) (citing PEW CHARITABLE 
TRUSTS, WHO’S WINNING THE CLEAN ENERGY RACE? (2010), available at 
http://www.eenews.net/public/25/14924/features/documents/2010/03/25/document_
cw_03.pdf). 
 For a household that consumes the 2001 
 248. HSU, supra note 105, at 181–91. 
 249. See, e.g., Christa Marshall, British Columbia Survives 3 Years and $848 
Million Worth of Carbon Taxes, CLIMATEWIRE (Mar. 22, 2011), 
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2011/03/22/1 (paid subscription) (“ ‘A huge 
question we are facing is how to deal with budget problems,’ [University of 
Michigan professor Barry] Rabe said. ‘Where are states going to get money? They 
don’t have many choices, and carbon is one place to look.’ ”). 
 250. One U.S. gallon of gasoline contains about 2.42 kg of carbon. N.C. COOP. 
EXTENSION, CONVERSION FACTORS FOR BIOENERGY (2008), available at 
http://www.ces.ncsu.edu/forestry/biomass/pubs/WB008.pdf. One kilogram of 
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U.S. average of 1143 gallons per year,251
Perhaps most importantly, this proposal would enjoy one 
critical political and optical advantage over other carbon tax 
proposals. Indexed as it is to destructive climate outcomes, all 
or a portion of proceeds of this carbon tax could be earmarked 
for disaster assistance for victims of climate outcomes. It could 
be considerably easier to sell a carbon tax that is viewed as 
being a funding mechanism for climate-related disaster (or 
even disaster unrelated to climate) such as hurricanes or 
droughts. Such a tax seems much more linked to ameliorating 
a problem than it is to a simple consumption tax burden and a 
government money-grab. 
 there is an average 
increase of about $56 per year in fuel costs. At some point, 
shrill cries of a carbon tax increasing gasoline prices will meet 
the reality that its actual cost would be relatively modest. 
More generally, carbon taxes must, for lack of any 
alternatives, soon emerge as an acceptable option. It is 
tempting to dismiss any carbon tax as politically unpalatable at 
this juncture. But even a moment’s reflection would suggest 
considerable potential for introducing a carbon tax. In the 
Canadian province of British Columbia, North America’s first 
carbon tax is being phased in from a level of about $10 (Cdn) 
per ton up to about $30 (Cdn) per ton, over five years, ending in 
2012.252 The governing political party that introduced the 
carbon tax, the Liberal Party, has survived the political storm, 
even picking up some support along the way,253
 
carbon is 5.34 pounds, which equals 0.00266 short tons. The molecular weight of 
carbon is 12, while the molecular weight of CO2 is 44. See Calculate Molecular 
Weight—Molar Mass Calculator, WEBQC.ORG, http://www.webqc.org/mmcalc.php 
(last visited May 3, 2011). Burning one gallon of gasoline thus emits 0.00266 short 
tons of carbon and 0.00978 short tons of CO2. A carbon tax of five dollars per ton 
of CO2 would thus result in a carbon tax of 4.89 cents per gallon. 
 suggesting that 
the resistance to a carbon tax in this range may not be 
immovable. One key to the success of the Liberal Party of 
British Columbia is that it was the more conservative of the 
two parties vying for power in the province. By outflanking its 
 251. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., HOUSEHOLD VEHICLES ENERGY USE: LATEST DATA 
AND TRENDS 57 tbl.A2 (2005), available at http://www.eia.gov/emeu/rtecs/ 
nhts_survey/2001/tablefiles/0464%282005%29.pdf. This only reports average 
consumption among U.S. households that own a car. The average per all 
households would be lower. 
 252. Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C. 2008, c. 40 (Can.), available at 
http://www.bclaws.ca/EPLibraries/bclaws_new/document/ID/freeside/ 
00_08040_01. 
 253. HSU, supra note 105, at 187. 
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more liberal and environmentally active rival party, the 
Liberal Party split the voters of its rival along environmental 
lines and undermined the rival’s traditionally solid and large 
base of environmental voters.254
CONCLUSION 
 Despite the label of “Liberal” 
for the governing party, American conservatives might take 
note of this political success. 
It is no exaggeration to say that markets inexplicably 
work. How exactly does information travel from one market 
participant to another, what form does that information take, 
and how does it get translated into prices? Nobody knows. As 
economist Maureen O’Hara has quipped, “while markets 
appear to work in practice, we are not sure they work in 
theory.”255
We are probably better off not giving in to cynicism when 
considering the arguments of those with whom we disagree 
about climate science, however tempting it is to think that the 
“other side” is just nuts or corrupt. However, the vast 
uncertainties, the enormous political stakes involved, and the 
very personal core values implicated by the problem of climate 
change, not to mention the large investments that both climate 
advocates and climate skeptics have in their particular 
substantive positions, give rise to a situation in which anybody 
can accuse anybody of taking a subjective interpretation of 
climate science. It is truly challenging under these 
circumstances to take a benign view of those with whom we 
disagree. This proposal, more than even addressing the 
 This proposal aims to tap into the mysterious 
efficiency of markets. This Article has left a number of details 
to future thought and design but has sketched out the basic 
parameters of a simple idea: Impose a carbon tax, specify that 
the carbon tax will be indexed to some climate outcomes, and 
offer to the taxed entities the opportunity to purchase permits 
to emit in lieu of paying the tax. These permits would be 
tradable after their initial auction. The idea of this proposal is 
to use the trading activity of the future emissions permits to 
generate some credible forecasts about what the indexed 
carbon tax will be and, hence, what climate outcomes will be. 
 
 254. Id. 
 255. Maureen O’Hara, Making Market Microstructure Matter, FIN. MGMT., 
Summer 1999, at 83, 83. 
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problem of reducing greenhouse gases, addresses the question 
of whom we truly believe and how sure we are of our beliefs. 
Markets are inherently imperfect, so the information 
generated by this proposal will be imperfect. It is not as if this 
cap-and-trade market will reveal the true climate science. 
Rather, what this proposal does is provide objective 
information about what others think. This information network 
aspect, similar to the information network embedded in market 
prices, is feedback more than it is information, and it serves as 
a challenge to our beliefs. While McKitrick’s proposal of a 
temperature-indexed carbon tax is meant to tap into nature as 
an “arbiter,” this proposal goes further and taps into both 
nature and markets as arbiters. Nature gets to determine the 
level of the carbon tax, but markets get to make important 
forecasts about what nature will do in the future. 
APPENDIX 
A. Construction of the Carbon Tax Index 
1. Global Mean Temperature 
As noted in Part IV.A.3.i, constructing a global mean 
temperature statistic raises thorny issues because 
temperature-taking is not uniform across the planet, and in 
some countries where it is taken the data are spotty and 
unreliable. Moreover, countries are sometimes reluctant to 
release their raw climate data except with confidentiality 
agreements that protect their proprietary interests.256 How 
does one “clean” or adjust data that are obviously faulty 
without being accused of tampering? This has been the plight 
of the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) at the University of East 
Anglia and its beleaguered director, Dr. Phil Jones, foci of the 
“Climategate” controversy.257 The CRU data are compilations 
of raw temperature readings compiled into 5° x 5° grid boxes 
for most of the land surface of the Earth.258
 
 256. Telephone interview with Xuebin Zhang, Research Scientist, Env’t Can. 
(Feb. 17, 2011). 
 While CRU makes 
its compilation publicly available, it irked climate skeptics by 
 257. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. 
 258. Phil Jones & Mike Salmon, Temperature, CLIMATIC RES. UNIT, U. E. 
ANGLIA, http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/data/temperature (last updated Jan. 2011). 
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refusing to divulge its raw data.259 The problem was that 
CRU’s raw data from weather stations throughout the world 
were provided by the national meteorological services of each 
country under the condition that the data not be publicly 
disseminated.260
Other datasets exist,
 Even demands by climate skeptics that CRU 
share its code would allow people to reverse engineer the 
publicly available data and re-create the raw data, violating 
the confidentiality agreements. 
261 but they are not free of controversy 
either. McKitrick proposes using an average temperature 
calculated from a dataset maintained by Roy Spencer and John 
Christy, researchers at the University of Alabama at 
Huntsville (UAH), which uses publicly available data from 
NOAA satellites and infers temperatures at different 
altitudes.262 The controversy surrounding this dataset stems 
from its deployment in past studies that seem to have shown 
no increase in global temperatures.263 Frank Wentz and 
Matthias Schabel argued that part of the cooling trend can be 
attributed to the orbital decay of the satellites from which the 
readings were taken.264 Spencer and Christy made 
adjustments to their analysis but have also made other 
adjustments that suggest that there is no warming trend, at 
least in the troposphere above ground level.265 A subsequent 
special report from the National Academy of Sciences 
concluded that it was possible that both sets of data were 
correct—that the surface temperatures may have warmed more 
quickly than tropospheric temperatures.266
 
 259. See supra note 
 Subsequent 
15. 
 260. Lauren Morello, ‘Climategate’ Scientist Admits ‘Awful Emails,’ But Peers 
Say IPCC Conclusions Remain Sound, CLIMATEWIRE (Mar. 2, 2010), 
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2010/03/02/2 (paid subscription); see also 
supra note 15. 
 261. For a brief description of the main datasets, see HENSON, supra note 48, 
at 178–80. 
 262. McKitrick, supra note 101, at 117–18. McKitrick’s specific proposal would 
average the temperature of the tropical troposphere, the lowest layer of the 
atmosphere—the one touching the Earth’s surface—over the tropical belt 
(between the Tropic of Capricorn and the Tropic of Cancer) around the Earth. Id. 
 263. Spencer & Christy, supra note 14, at 1558. 
 264. Frank J. Wentz & Matthias Schabel, Effects of Orbital Decay on Satellite-
Derived Lower-Tropospheric Temperature Trends, 394 NATURE 661, 661 (1998). 
 265. John R. Christy et al., Tropospheric Temperature Change Since 1979 from 
Tropical Radiosonde and Satellite Measurements, 112 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 
D06102, 1 (2007). 
 266. PANEL ON RECONCILING TEMPERATURE OBSERVATIONS, BD. ON 
ATMOSPHERIC SCIS. & CLIMATE, RECONCILING OBSERVATIONS OF GLOBAL 
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analyses of the data now appear to have reconciled them with 
other datasets.267
These are live controversies that need to be addressed, but 
for purposes of indexing a carbon tax, they seem susceptible to 
resolution. There is no disagreement in principle, even between 
climate scientists and climate skeptics (who of course include 
scientists), that the use of some global temperature measure is 
a fundamental indicator of climate change. At a minimum, the 
UAH data, which have now been tested and reconciled with 
other datasets, and which Professor McKitrick proposes be 
used for an index, would seem to be a reasonable beginning 
point. 
 
2. Days of Unusually High or Low Temperatures 
“Unusual” implies some comparison with historical 
standards and would obviously be location specific, as the 
average for a polar location would be much lower than the 
average for a tropical one. Fortunately, the Expert Team on 
Climate Change Detection and Indices (ETCCDI), a working 
group of climate scientists attempting to collect and process 
temperature data throughout the world,268 provides a head 
start on thinking about temperature extremes. Seeking to 
process raw temperature and precipitation data in a way that 
does not violate confidentiality agreements that inevitably 
come with the data, the ETCCDI has developed an index of 
twenty-seven outcomes (the ETCCDI calls them “indices”) 
through which to run the data and create a separate 
database.269
Included in the ETCCDI basket of “indices” are a number 
of statistics aimed at measuring the duration and severity of 
temperature and precipitation anomalies (both extreme 
 In other words, the “indices” are a transformation 
of the raw data—a way of presenting the same information 
without the actual raw data. 
 
TEMPERATURE CHANGE 2 (2000), available at http://www.nap.edu/ 
catalog/9755.html. 
 267. Henson describes the UAH data and documents the controversy among 
climate scientists on the reliability of the UAH dataset. HENSON, supra note 48, 
at 183–85. 
 268. Overview, EXPERT TEAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE DETECTION & INDICES, 
http://cccma.seos.uvic.ca/ETCCDI/index.shtml (last updated Sept. 15, 2009). 
 269. Climate Change Indices, EXPERT TEAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE DETECTION 
& INDICES, http://cccma.seos.uvic.ca/ETCCDI/list_27_indices.shtml (last updated 
Sept. 15, 2009). 
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precipitation and drought).270
1. The percentage of days in which the daily maximum 
temperature was higher than ninety percent of the following: 
the daily maximum temperature readings for that same 
calendar day in the base years 1961 to 1990, plus the two days 
before and the two days after that calendar day, also in the 
years 1961 to 1990;
 Prominent among the indices are 
two that suit the purpose of this proposal well: 
271
2. The percentage of days in which the daily minimum 
temperature was lower than ninety percent of the same set of 
temperature readings.
 and 
272
For example, if the ninetieth percentile of all daily 
maximums from June 13 to June 17, 1961 to 1990, was 88°, 
then any June 15 with a daily maximum temperature of 89° or 
more would be counted for purposes of this index as an 
“unusually high” day. By the same token, if the tenth 
percentile for all daily minimums from March 2 to March 6, 
1961 to 1990, was 13°, any March 4 on which the daily 
minimum was 12° or lower would be counted as an “unusual 
low.” 
 
These two indices measure the extremes of heat and cold—
the hottest it gets on hot days, and the coldest it gets on cold 
days. It is also possible to include some measure of the 
persistence of such heat and cold by including the minimum 
temperature on hot days273 and the maximum temperature on 
cold days.274
The ETCCDI’s work is a work in progress. In constructing 
an index, it is also important to consider how to choose 
locations from which data will be processed and become part of 
the index. As the ETCCDI continues to work with and process 
datasets, this question is also one that requires deft resolution. 
 Using the same method of comparing daily 
measurements against a historical five-day window centered 
upon the calendar day in which the measurement is taken, the 
ETCCDI aims to provide some measurement of how 
persistently hot and cold days can be without relief. 
 
 270. Id. (indices 17–27). 
 271. Id. (index 13). 
 272. Id. (index 10). 
 273. Id. (index 12). 
 274. Id. (index 11). 
252 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
3. Extreme Rainfall and Drought Events 
Even “flooding” and “drought” are somewhat subjective 
terms and require some formal definition. A number of indices 
taking into account drought are possible, but it is useful to 
refer again to the work of the ETCCDI. As with #2 (days of 
unusually high or low temperatures), some transformation of 
raw data is necessary. It seems desirable to compare data with 
historical records of precipitation in the comparable time of 
year so that the precipitation in wet areas such as coastal 
British Columbia are evaluated in the context of how wet it has 
been in the past. With dry areas, however, extreme and 
prolonged dryness render this way of counting dry days 
statistically difficult. If it has historically been bone-dry in 
Phoenix every single summer for the entire period of 1961 to 
1990,275
Consistent with the objectives of this climate index, two 
statistics under consideration by the ETCCDI seem helpful in 
measuring extreme rainfalls and droughts: 
 there will be no ninetieth percentile, or any other 
percentile. There is no such thing as “unusually dry” when 
looking at summers in Phoenix. 
1. The total number of days in which the precipitation is 
greater than ninety-nine percent of all wet days (defined as 
getting more than one millimeter of rain, just a very small 
amount) in the entire period from 1961 to 1990. In other words, 
extreme rain is evaluated against the wettest days in the entire 
thirty-year period from 1961 to 1990.276
2. The length of droughts, i.e., the number of consecutive 
days in which there was less than one millimeter of rain.
 
277 
The Bureau of Meteorology in Australia is able to get 
around the statistical dryness problem by aggregating data 
over a region and averaging them over an entire year. The 
Bureau defines a drought as rainfall over three consecutive 
months that is in the lowest ten percent of what has been 
recorded for that region in the past.278
 
 275. From 1971 to 2000, average rainfall in Phoenix was as follows: April, 0.25 
inches; May, 0.16 inches; June, 0.09 inches; July, 0.99 inches; and August, 0.94 
inches. Judy Hedding, Does It Rain in Phoenix, AZ?, ABOUT.COM, 
http://phoenix.about.com/od/weather/qt/rain.htm (last visited May 4, 2011). 
 Of course, droughts 
could be extremely long periods of time with very limited 
 276. Climate Change Indices, supra note 269 (index 26). 
 277. Id. (index 23). 
 278. Climate Glossary: Drought, BUREAU METEOROLOGY, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, 
http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/glossary/drought.shtml (last visited Jan. 3, 2011). 
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rainfall. The economically vital Murray-Darling basin in 
Australia experienced almost a decade of low rainfall279 
(though not all of it within the definition of “drought”).280
4. Sea Level Rise 
 
As oceans warm along with the rest of the planet, they 
expand in volume, accounting for a significant part of sea level 
rises to date.281 This much is not in doubt, but the contribution 
of melting, land-based glaciers is cause for concern and may 
cause oceans to rise by several meters rather than several 
inches.282
As with other climate indicators meant to measure 
something on a planetary scale, measuring sea levels is 
surprisingly difficult. Because of tectonic changes in land and 
ocean beds, using land as a reference point is flawed, so using 
tidal gauges—putting a measuring stick in the ocean and 
taking periodic measurements—is inadequate.
 
283 More 
advanced systems now use satellite data to measure mean sea 
levels with error of less than one millimeter.284
5. Ocean Acidity 
 For purposes of 
measuring ocean level rises, satellite data collected by several 
governments do not, unlike other climate data, seem to be 
controversial. 
Measuring the average pH of the world’s oceans is not, at 
this time, a particularly controversial exercise, in part because 
so little attention has been focused on this subject.285 With 
oceans occupying seventy-one percent of the Earth’s surface,286
 
 279. Annual Australian Climate Statement 2010, BUREAU METEOROLOGY, 
AUSTRALIAN GOV’T (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.bom.gov.au/announcements/ 
media_releases/climate/change/20110105.shtml. 
 
and given the importance of ocean life to humankind, ocean 
chemistry would appear to be a vital statistic to include in an 
index of climate outcomes. 
 280. Drought Statement, BUREAU METEOROLOGY, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T (Dec. 3, 
2008), http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/drought/archive/20081203.shtml. 
 281. IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT, supra note 26, at 408. 
 282. HENSON, supra note 48, at 111–18. 
 283. Id. at 107–08. 
 284. Id. at 108. 
 285. Id. at 124. 
 286. Ocean, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
http://www.noaa.gov/ocean.html (last visited May 4, 2011). 
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6. Hurricanes Above a Certain Intensity Level 
Hurricane intensity is commonly measured using the 
Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale, which rates hurricane 
strength on the basis of the maximum sustained wind speed 
during a hurricane.287 A category 3 hurricane is one in which 
the peak wind speeds are 111 to 130 miles per hour, category 4 
is one in which peak speeds are 131 to 155, and category 5 is 
one in which the peak speeds are greater than 155 miles per 
hour.288 A “major” hurricane is a category 3, 4, or 5 storm.289 
Between 1900 and 2000, twenty-five of thirty-one of the 
deadliest hurricanes were category 3 or higher, and ten of the 
twelve deadliest were category 4 or higher.290
In most cases, the bulk of the damage from hurricanes 
comes from the storm surges that inundate coastal areas and 
account for the vast majority of deaths directly attributable to 
hurricanes.
 
291 The old Saffir-Simpson scale used to incorporate 
central pressures and storm surges as part of the index.292 To 
avoid confusion, however, and because storm surges vary 
greatly by topography, the index was simplified to only include 
hurricane peak wind speeds.293
Counting hurricanes and monitoring their wind speeds 
have been done uncontroversially, if inconsistently, for over a 
century. A number of hurricane-tracking sites exist, but the 
best global compilation of hurricane data is maintained by a 
private security management firm, Unisys.
 Using a simpler index, focusing 
on wind speed, would be consistent with the objectives of this 
index of climate outcomes. 
294 Unisys compiles 
information about hurricanes in each of the six major oceanic 
regions, collecting data from a number of national and 
international sources.295
 
 287. Timothy Schott et al., Saffir-Simpson Team, The Saffir-Simpson 
Hurricane Wind Scale, NAT’L HURRICANE CENTER, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/ 
sshws.pdf (last visited July 21, 2011). 
 While the relatively short history (for 
 288. Id. The National Hurricane Center’s Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind 
Scale states that in hurricanes of category 4 or category 5 strength, “[c]atastrophic 
damage will occur,” and that in hurricanes of category 3 strength, “[d]evastating 
damage will occur.” Id. 
 289. Jarrell et al., supra note 187. 
 290. Id. 
 291. See id. 
 292. Schott et al., supra note 287. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Hurricane/Tropical Data, supra note 114. 
 295. Id. 
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climate data) handicaps efforts to attribute hurricanes to 
climate change, it is clearly long enough to support 
construction of an index including hurricane data. 
B. Cap-and-Trade Permit Auction Schedule 
If 400 million permits for each vintage year were to be 
issued each of the forty years preceding the vintage date, ten 
million would have to be issued each year. So starting in the 
year 2012, ten million 2052 permits would be auctioned per 
year, ending in the year 2051. But what about all of the years 
prior to 2052? For some years, more than ten million permits 
for a vintage year would have to be issued. For 2014 permits, 
should the bulk of them be auctioned in 2012 or 2013? To 
maximize the amount of information garnered by this 
prediction market, and to make sure the permit markets are as 
healthy as possible, the bulk of them should be issued in 
2012—390 million, with the remaining ten million to be 
auctioned in 2013. Also in 2012, 380 million permits to emit in 
2014 would be auctioned, with ten million in each of the 
following years. In other words, 2012 should be the year in 
which all excess permits are issued, with ten million permits 
for every vintage year being issued in each successive year. The 
schedule is set forth below in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Schedule of Permit Auctions 
Year of 
auction 
Vintage Years 
2013 2014 2015 ••• 2050 2051 2052 2053 
2012 400m 390m 380m ••• 30m 20m 10m  
2013  10m 10m ••• 10m 10m 10m 10m 
2014   10m ••• 10m 10m 10m 10m 
• 
• 
• 
    • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
2049     10m 10m 10m 10m 
2050      10m 10m 10m 
2051       10m 10m 
2052        10m 
 
